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A. INTRODUCTION

1. Soviet Foreign Policy and the Roles of the MFA and KGB in Soviet Representations Abroad

The foreign policies of the Soviet State are established not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Politburo acts, of course, on the basis of information and analyses provided it by a number of subordinate ministries and State Committees, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) being one among many. But the Politburo enjoys a complete monopoly over the initiation and formulation of Soviet foreign policy and directly controls its execution.

Since its inception, the Soviet regime, being the embodiment of Communist ideology, has been dedicated to the world-wide establishment of Soviet Communism. Thus, its foreign policy has been essentially revolutionary; its objectives are hostile to and destructive of the existing order in non-Communist states, and its methods, unhindered by conventional morality, include whatever may be effective within the practical limits of the moment: manipulation through penetration agents and agents of influence of the economic and political policies of foreign governments, disruption, incitement of disorders, sabotage, kidnapping, assassination, financial and other support of revolutionary or opposition parties or groups, psychological warfare, provocation and deception. No "relaxation of tension" has changed this, although the possibilities open to the Soviets today are very limited in many areas. But even where sweeping change is clearly not feasible, Soviet foreign policy has as its minimum objective the creation of a political climate which is not actively hostile to the USSR, and within which the various elements of the Soviet foreign policy machine are enabled to work in relative freedom toward the ultimate subversion of the host nation and related countries.

The organs of the Politburo which pursue such revolutionary aims and use such methods are necessarily of a different order from Western ministries of foreign affairs. The latter are usually the central executive organs for foreign policy; they help define policy, they attempt subtly to influence foreign governments to favorable positions and they maintain routine international economic, political and cultural relations within an accepted status quo. In the Soviet Union, bent on changing the status quo, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — which in fact

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does carry out traditional "diplomacy" — is not the Politburo's primary action arm abroad; the KGB is. The KGB enjoys position, power and assets quite inconceivable in a Western framework, because it is also the "sword" which keeps the One Party in power. The KGB's special position includes a dominance over the organizations of "diplomacy": the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and relation institutions.

The functioning of a Soviet embassy abroad can only be understood if this background is grasped. Once it is, it can be understood why, of the some 5,500 Soviets currently assigned to official installations abroad (excluding military and economic aid missions) about 3,000 are staff officers of the KGB and GRU. Over half of all the Soviets permanently stationed in a given country may be intelligence officers, while there is an average of 75 percent of RIS officers among Soviets carried on official diplomatic lists.

All elements of a Soviet embassy are known to have provided cover for intelligence officers. Numerous Soviet ambassadors have been reliably identified as intelligence officers earlier in their careers. Whether they retain staff intelligence status upon becoming ambassadors is not known, but it is more than coincidence that many such ambassadors with established intelligence backgrounds, particularly in political and subversive operations, are now representing the Soviet Union in Africa and the Near East where Soviet policy objectives emphasize subversion rather than diplomacy, or even espionage. Political, cultural, scientific, and economic counselor posts are more often than not occupied by intelligence officers. Consular offices have historically provided cover for KGB officers, and in several Soviet installations all consular officers were known intelligence officers. Outside as well as inside the embassy, the press and information offices are heavily occupied by intelligence officers. One defector estimated that 70 - 80 percent of all TASS representatives are KGB or GRU. All other Soviet governmental agencies having representation abroad are known to have provided cover for Soviet intelligence. A recent survey of AEROFLOT representatives revealed that over 70 percent were known or suspect GRU officers. In a Near Eastern country the head of the Baltic and Black Sea Company office was a KGB officer who engaged in operations aimed at penetrating the local American embassy. There are other such examples too numerous to mention. Thus, all significant aspects of Soviet official activities abroad are conducted either by KGB or GRU officers, or by other Soviet officials who have been co-opted as agents of these services, or by non-intelligence officers whose superiors or close colleagues are intelligence officers or agents.

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Nonetheless, ever since the very beginning of the Soviet regime, the Bolsheviks have been genuinely eager to maintain a facade of respectability and of polite international intercourse with non-Communist governments, even while they are simultaneously undermining those governments. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has, therefore, had a real function, but it should always be viewed in the light of the underlying reality of the revolutionary Soviet State. Its overt functions, as the pages below will show, are similar to those of Western ministries of foreign affairs. But Soviet "diplomacy," the overt part of the MFA representation, should not be misconstrued as representing the central means of execution of Soviet foreign policy in the host country.

2. The Overt Work of a Soviet Diplomatic Mission

The chief responsibility of the Soviet diplomat is to promote the overt Party line on a great variety of subjects, by any and all overt and semi-overt means at his disposal. Concomitantly, the Soviet diplomat has the responsibility of gathering a great variety of information on host-country topics, concerning both internal and external affairs, from overt and semi-overt sources.

As the term is used by the RIS — and by other professional services throughout the world — the Soviet diplomat is not an intelligence officer. Except in those cases where he is clandestinely an RIS officer or has been co-opted by one or another of the rezidenturas, the Soviet diplomat does not handle foreign national agents. The Soviet diplomat does not seek contact with foreigners except in order to comply with orders from his ambassador, who in turn acts in response to specific directives. Thus his cultivation is primarily for the purpose of attempting to persuade foreigners to accept the current overt Party line on a certain subject, or to elicit from them certain overt and semi-overt information. Once established, of course, this contact is often exploited by the KGB or GRU.

While they vary little from the tasks of all embassies, some of the known overt functions of Soviet embassies are noted here:

- Delivering aides memoires and similar documents to the host foreign office, and arranging protocol visits between the ambassador (and other senior embassy officers), and ranking officials of the host government.
- Studying the host-country press, both that of the

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capital and of the provinces, for articles of interest. This consumes a good part of each day. The Soviet diplomat clips many of these and sends them to the appropriate geographical area divisions of the MFA headquarters, accompanied by an analysis of the content. In a large embassy, the individual officer may be charged with the responsibility of covering a specific field, e.g., cultural events, whereas in a small embassy all officers will be expected to watch over several categories of information. KGB and GRU officers under MFA cover spend little of their time at this activity; it is the MFA officer who is burdened with this task.

- Making contacts in various strata of host-country society — in foreign office and governmental circles, among business and industrial groups, in press and journalistic circles, among writers and other intellectuals. Such contacts are usually made upon receipt of a directive from Moscow to propagandize the Soviet position on a specific subject, for example MLF or the nuclear test-ban. The line taken is usually the same one which appears in the overt Soviet press, in some cases tailored according to the degree of sophistication of the Soviet who is delivering it. (See paragraph A-4, entitled Participation of the RIS Rezidenturas in the Work of a Soviet Diplomatic Mission for comments on KGB variations on the official line.) At the same time, the Soviet attempts to elicit from his foreign contact overt and semi-overt information and informed opinion on the subject at hand. Detailed descriptions of the specific overt work of the various sections of a Soviet mission will be found under B-1, B-2 and B-3.

3. CC/CPSU Comments on the Work of Soviet Diplomatic Missions

The overt work of Soviet diplomatic missions was described in Moscow in the early 1960s by members of the Politburo and the CC/CPSU in lectures to a group of ranking officials from MFA headquarters and Soviet embassies throughout the world. Some of the points made were as follows:

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- Praise was given for the number of ideological speeches (to foreign audiences) given or sponsored during a certain period: 216 speeches in England; 150 in Poland; 115 in the United States; 35 in Denmark; 30 in Norway; 20 in France, and a series of weekly lectures given in Sweden.
- More effort was recommended in promoting Communism in Japan, the African countries, Latin America, and certain countries of Western Europe.
- The circulation of materials explaining the objectives of the 22nd CPSU Congress was urged by encouraging mass publication in the local press and by distribution of bulletins and hand-out materials. Motion pictures, show window displays, informative letters sent to individuals in the host country, and radio and lecture programs were suggested as additional means of promoting widespread knowledge of the work of the 22nd CPSU Congress.
- The embassy in New Delhi was complimented for publishing the then-current Khrushchev report in a million copies in 14 languages and for printing 5,000 articles in the press.
- In 1961, 900 articles were published in the United States press and 70 brochures were published there in 700,000 copies.
- Dissemination of political literature was further urged through the facilities presented by the Commercial Missions abroad and through Mezhkniga (International Book).
- Better reporting from embassies was stressed. Although the Soviet Embassy in Rome was praised for a diary system in which day-to-day contacts and complete conversations were kept and transmitted to MFA headquarters, it was judged that too little emphasis had been placed on eliciting political commentary and political information; more than half of the reports from Italy concerned cultural matters. Other needs in reporting were for full texts of host-country governmental pronouncements; analysis of and comments on host-country connections with NATO and

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the Common Market. Reporting in depth was urged on all major international questions, i.e., disarmament, the German question, liquidation of colonies and the Franco-German accord.

A ranking member of a geographical area division of the MFA made the following comments in the early 1960s concerning the general work of embassies in the countries under his jurisdiction:

- In general, reporting from the various embassies is satisfactory, and covers the problems with which the area division is concerned. However, certain shortcomings have been observed which require improvement.
- Too many reports non-political in nature are forwarded to Moscow. One embassy's reporting was over 50 percent cultural and educational in nature. While such material may have a certain value, it has little value as an aid to political analysis; and in general such reporting is a waste of the time of the embassy staffers who prepare it.
- There is too great a delay in reporting information of significance. The embassy staff must realize what is important and report it immediately. (The speaker cited a certain piece of information which was received at MFA headquarters, not from the embassy in the country where the event happened but from one of the Soviet correspondents in that country. He noted that the MFA queried the embassy on the basis of the correspondent's report, but still got no reply from the embassy until more than two weeks later. The speaker noted further in this regard that the report which the embassy finally submitted was accompanied neither by analysis nor appropriate suggestions for action by Moscow or the field.)
- The MFA has the impression that its queries to the embassies are too often regarded as being only pro forma, to be answered, ignored, or answered only after great delay, according to the whim of the embassy staff. Each query to the field is sent in response to a requirement from within the MFA, from the leadership of the MFA, or from "on high,"

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therefore each embassy must adhere to the suspense dates cited in the queries.

- Many suggestions for propaganda actions forwarded by the embassies are unsound. As an example, certain embassies have proposed that the cosmonauts be invited to their countries. MFA has responded with questions as to which organizations in the foreign country would issue the invitations and be responsible for the cosmonauts during their visits, etc., but the embassies have failed to respond and the matter has been left unresolved. Similarly, all embassies request that noted Soviet artists be sent to their countries, without taking into consideration that there is only one Moscow State Circus, one Moiseyev Ballet, one Richter, one Gilels, and so forth.
- Reporting on local political figures is inadequate. Such reporting too often lacks specific detail on the individual's background and, worse, on his political orientation and his attitude towards the USSR.
- The source of much reporting from embassies is too limited. In most cases embassy reporting is based on the local press, while what little good reporting there is is derived from conversations with local citizens. Sources of information must be widened to include local private citizens, local government officials and suchlike. Embassies are requested to forward the full texts of official governmental announcements and to report in full the pronouncements of individual government officials.
- The embassies (in a given geographical area) during the year _____, forwarded some 2,000 reports of conversation with foreigners. However, many of these reports were faulty. In many instances our comrades failed to take the initiative in posing foreign policy questions to the local citizens, and failed to propagandize the themes of the 22nd Party Congress. In many other cases it was clear that our comrades understand incorrectly and interpret incorrectly the foreign policy course of the Soviet government, and thus prepare themselves inadequately for conversations with foreigners. In certain instances, some comrades

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failed completely to touch on political themes.

- In many cases comrades have not gotten from local citizens all the information which they could have. For instance, in talking with a local citizen, it becomes obvious that that citizen has information about, or is a member of a certain organization. Some comrades, however, have failed to ask such questions as what type of work the organization is doing, what sort of material it publishes, how well it is known in the local country, and so forth.

In conclusion, the overt work of a Soviet embassy in any country is to propagandize the CPSU line current at any given time, by all overt and semi-overt means, and to collect a great variety of overt and semi-overt information by other than clandestine means from the public press and by making contacts among all possible strata of host-country society. In the course of this work the Soviet diplomat is expected to write a great volume of analyses of local events, to gather quantities of newspaper clippings and to prepare reports of conversation with foreigners; all of which are forwarded to the MFA in Moscow. With the exception of clipping items from the host-country press, this work is done by both the Soviet diplomat and, in his cover capacity, by the KGB and GRU officer.

4. Participation of the RIS Rezidenturas in the Work of a Soviet Diplomatic Mission

No description of the organization and functions of an overt Soviet mission could be complete without comment on the role which the KGB and GRU play in it. Outside the Soviet Bloc, RIS personnel constitute well over half of the diplomatic staff and even in MFA headquarters in Moscow it appears that almost half of the personnel assigned to geographical area and support divisions may be known or suspect RIS officers. There is an entire cadre of RIS officers which employs MFA cover both abroad and in the USSR, and which has grown increasingly since the end of World War II until it now occupies well over half the diplomatic slots of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

This being the case, what is the exact role of the RIS in the work of a Soviet diplomatic mission? To what extent do RIS officers participate in overt diplomatic work; does their participation in overt work differ from that of the "straight" Soviet diplomat; and by whom is their overt work directed? Briefly,

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the RIS officer who occupies a diplomatic slot does the same type of overt work as his non-RIS diplomatic colleagues, but only to the extent that his primary job, RIS work, permits. The RIS officer under diplomatic cover is assigned his overt tasks directly or indirectly by the ambassador, who expects him to do a certain amount of "straight" MFA work.

At the same time, the RIS officer under diplomatic cover, as well as under Commercial Mission, news service and other non-diplomatic cover, finds his cover duties in complete or near-complete consonance with his RIS tasks and targets. In general terms, the principal difference between the way the MFA diplomat carries out his official duties and the RIS officer his cover duties, is that the MFA diplomat tends to restrict his contacts with foreigners to official and representational occasions, while the RIS officer spends most of his working hours outside the official installations, making a great variety of contacts among the local population. On the other hand, we have observed numerous occasions when an MFA diplomat has "teamed up" with an RIS officer at an official function, the diplomat conducting himself in a formal manner while his RIS colleague moves busily about, seeking out foreigners of interest to his rezidentura.

Concerning the propagandizing of a given CPSU "line," RIS — principally KGB — officers in "private" conversation with foreigners are known to have taken a tack different from, and at times at variance with, the line which other Soviets in the host country and other parts of the world were taking. These variants are often prefaced by a remark such as, "The official line is so-and-so, but my private opinion is" In every such case it is safe to assume that the speaker is doing this in order either to spread "disinformation" or to attract the attention of his listener in the hope that the latter can be drawn into a relationship which can be exploited operationally.

Rezidentura members participate in routine Party work within the mission, and may also play minor roles in mestkom activity. They pay rent for their living quarters, contribute their share to the overall costs of the utilities if they reside in a compound, and follow MFA accounting and travel regulations when carrying out their overt functions. Members of the rezidenturas are paid according to their cover grades, and receive their local salaries at the same time and in the same manner as bona fide officers and employees. However, it is equally obvious

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that they have ready access to operational and representational funds far in excess to anything which the bona fide diplomat enjoys. Despite the extent to which the RIS officer may participate in the routine work of the mission, he — and particularly the KGB officer — clearly considers himself to be superior to his MFA colleagues; an attitude which hardly endears him to others and heightens the atmosphere of hostility in the mission.

B. COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MISSION ABROAD

The Soviet diplomatic mission abroad is under the overall supervision of the ambassador, who functions as coordinator of all Soviet activities save intelligence operations in the host country. In this capacity the ambassador is directly responsible to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the day-to-day coordination of all overt aspects of Soviet foreign policy in the country to which he is assigned. The composition of the mission under the ambassador's supervision is as follows:

- The ambassador's personal staff.
- The administrative staff of the embassy.
- The referentura (communications center and area where the preparation of reports and similar work of the MFA staff and the KGB and GRU rezidenturas is carried on).
- The Political Section.
- The Cultural and Press and Information Sections (in large embassies, two separate entities).
- The Economic Section which in certain countries of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, supervises the work of the Soviet Military Aid Program personnel and the Technical Aid Projects personnel.
- The Consular Section.
- The Military Attache's Office.
- The Commercial Mission
- The press correspondents (TASS, Novosti, Pravda, etc.)

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- The Scientific and Technical Section (found in a very limited number of countries).

1. The Ambassador

a. The Soviet ambassador is appointed by, and is responsible to the CC/CPSU. The MFA may recommend to the CC/CPSU a given individual as ambassador, and obviously the MFA concurs in the choice of an ambassador-designate by the Central Committee, but the Central Committee (in actuality, the Politburo) apparently makes its own choice and MFA concurrence is merely a formality. Although well over half the number of Soviet ambassadors currently serving abroad have been officials of the MFA for over 10 years, a significant number had no experience in diplomacy prior to their present assignments. Most of these men were appointed directly from relatively high positions in the Party apparatus, while a few came from high administrative posts in the Soviet government. Of all Soviet ambassadors now serving abroad, 11 are full members of the CC/CPSU.

The personal background and current standing in the Party hierarchy of Soviet ambassadors, of course, varies; some are more powerful than others; some enjoy considerable personal prestige in high places in Moscow, while others are little more than petty bureaucrats; and some have been "dumped" into their present positions by the clique currently in power, in order to remove from the Moscow scene men who represent a potential or actual challenge to the power and authority of that clique. Because of these differences, and because of differences in personality, the conduct of Soviet ambassadors throughout the world in dealing with foreigners differs widely; some appear to be highly self-confident men who possess a considerable amount of personal authority while others seem to be automatons totally lacking in initiative.

At the same time, the Soviet ambassador, irrespective of his personal position in Moscow, is permitted little latitude when dealing with foreigners in the host country concerning substantive matters relative to Soviet foreign policy. Each Soviet ambassador is guided by, and is completely submissive to, directives sent to him by the MFA leadership, acting on orders of the CC/CPSU, or directly by the CC/CPSU; and these directives establish the framework within which he and his staff are permitted to operate. Depending on his own self-confidence, engendered by a sure knowledge of his position with the ruling clique (or lack thereof), initiative and personality, the Soviet ambassador appears to be permitted a certain freedom in executing these directives, but he knows clearly where the established

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limits lie. In many instances, Soviet ambassadors have given evasive answers or have refused to answer questions on various aspects of Soviet life and foreign policy put to them by members of the host-country press and foreign office or by prominent local citizens, all touching on subjects on which the ambassador is known to have received no official guidance from Moscow. Host-country foreign offices have presented Soviet ambassadors with requests for urgent replies concerning important issues, but when uncertain of the Party hierarchy's wishes in the matter, ambassadors have refused to make even an interim reply of any substance. Instead, they cabled the requests to Moscow and remained silent until precise instructions were received.

There is no truly composite Soviet ambassador except in one sense — his absolute responsiveness to the orders and wishes of the Politburo of the CC/CPSU in executing the aims of Soviet foreign policy in the country to which he is assigned. Whether the Soviet ambassador appears to be urbane and sophisticated, a truculent boor or a provincial bureaucrat out of the pages of 19th Century Russian literature, he is appointed to his post because of a proven ability to carry out orders and, depending on the political climate of the host country, to do so with much or little imagination.

Many Soviet ambassadors appear to Western eyes to be singularly ill-qualified for their tasks, often lacking any knowledge of foreign languages, frequently appearing to have little or no knowledge of the history, traditions and customs of the host country, and at times conducting themselves in public in a manner boorish, awkward and offensive to the local inhabitants. It is obvious that these shortcomings have little or no meaning for officialdom in the USSR as the Soviet ambassador is clearly regarded by the highest echelons of the Soviet hierarchy as being fully capable of carrying out the directives and orders of the CC/CPSU with regard to the proper conduct of Soviet foreign policy in the country to which he is assigned. While the Soviet ambassador does indeed hold general coordinating authority over all the elements of the Soviet colony, his most immediate concerns are the day-to-day conduct of Soviet foreign policy by the various elements operating from the embassy; administrative matters within the embassy; the conduct of CPSU affairs within the embassy and the Commercial Mission; the daily lives and conduct of all Soviet personnel assigned to the embassy.

The ambassador's work day usually begins with a lengthy perusal of the local press. In those instances where the ambassador cannot read the indigenous language, his interpreter/

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secretary (usually male) translates for him, reading articles touching on Soviet interest. Since Soviet interest covers a great range of topics, the translating/reading period may take several hours. The ambassador frequently cables a report to Moscow, at times to the MFA and other times directly to the CC/CPSU, depending on the subject, giving a precis of an interesting article and his comments thereon. If the ambassador believes that the article does not warrant a cable, he will forward it in the diplomatic pouch. (Although the ambassador and his /non-RIS/ staff forward great numbers of articles taken from the local press, we have noticed a tendency to send on only those articles which are favorable to the Soviet Union, or which at least indicate a present or growing pro-Soviet attitude on the part of the local government or of certain important segments of the local society.)

The balance of the ambassador's day can be divided into two categories of work: diplomatic affairs and embassy affairs. When engaged in the former category, the ambassador calls on and receives ranking officials of the host foreign office and government, leading members of political parties, prominent local businessmen engaged in or interested in trading with the Soviet Union, and the heads of delegations traveling to the Soviet Union; appears at the principal ceremonies of the local Soviet Friendship Society, and so on. The ambassador attempts on every such occasion to propagandize the current Soviet foreign policy line, and to elicit from the prominent local figures whom he meets information based on requirements from Moscow. (This activity is in no sense to be confused with the information-gathering activities of the KGB and GRU rezidenturas. The ambassador and the diplomatic /non-RIS/ staff attempt to elicit semi-overt information from local persons of prominence in governmental, business, political and intellectual circles, and in turn to bring these persons towards a pro-Soviet orientation. The KGB and GRU rezidenturas gather hard, accurate, objective classified information by classic covert means, and, in the case of the KGB residency, manipulate agents of influence in high places in the local society.)

b. External Responsibilities of the Ambassador

The frequency of a Soviet ambassador's appearances outside the embassy on official business varies with the attitude of the Soviet government toward the host country, e.g., if the government of the host country supports [REDACTED] on an inter- 25X1A2g national issue which the USSR opposes, the Soviet ambassador's

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protocol visits will decrease in frequency and often stop altogether, until local attitudes have become more favorable to the USSR, or until the crisis has passed. Conversely, in countries outside the Bloc where the government is "neutral," pro-USSR or only superficially anti-USSR and/or the local Communist Party is large, legal or vocal, the ambassador (and his staff) will be seen with great frequency outside the embassy, making all manner of protocol calls, attending a great variety of receptions, and so on. On the other hand, the ambassador is equally active in those countries which have long maintained a pro-US posture, attempting to wean the most significant elements of their population away from the United States and toward a pro-Soviet or neutralist attitude.

In addition to calling on and receiving nationals of the host country, the Soviet ambassador also visits and is visited by ambassadors and ministers of the Bloc countries accredited to the host government. In recent years the Soviet ambassador often receives and is received by his Yugoslav counterpart but, since approximately 1960, there has been very limited interchange between the Soviet and Communist Chinese envoys. In discussions between Soviet and Bloc ambassadors, the Soviet ambassador seeks, among other things, to persuade his Bloc counterpart to maintain a pro-Soviet line in all his dealings in the host country; and we know that the Soviet ambassador reports all conversations with Bloc representatives to Moscow immediately and in detail.

Aside from purely protocol calls such as the presentation of letters of accreditation, any call which a Soviet ambassador makes on any local governmental official or citizen of prominence, and any invitation of a social or cultural nature issued to local citizens in the name of the ambassador, is made for the sole purpose of fulfilling a policy directive from Moscow. It is, of course, understood that the KGB and GRU rezidenturas profit heavily from "social" affairs held at the embassy and attended by numbers of foreigners, since they afford excellent opportunities for spotting, assessing and developing agent prospects, as well as for meeting recruited agents. From the points of view of the ambassador and the non-RIS diplomatic staff, however, these gatherings serve primarily as vehicles for propagandizing the current Soviet line, for eliciting semi-overt information and for influencing prominent local persons towards a pro-Soviet orientation; all as directed by Moscow in specific orders to the embassy.

c. Internal Responsibilities of the Ambassador

Within the embassy, the duties of a Soviet ambassador

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are extremely diversified and many-faceted. He is responsible for the day-to-day conduct of Soviet foreign policy in the host country; is chief of the kollektiv (the total number of Soviet citizens employed in a given unit of production or office, e.g., "the embassy kollektiv"; "the Commercial Mission kollektiv"); guardian and trustee of Soviet property and funds in the host country; and overseer of all activities of the various units of the CPSU in the local Soviet colony. While the ambassador clearly defers to the KGB rezident in matters concerning the security of Soviet colony personnel, and refrains from interfering in the strictly operational work of the KGB and GRU residencies, in almost all other matters he regards himself as the chief of the Soviet mission.

The following paragraphs describe the many activities in which a Soviet ambassador is engaged inside the embassy. Those experienced in the ways of Western ambassadors will find parts of this picture incredible, but it is based on information accurately reported by a variety of highly reliable sources.

- As chief of the kollektiv, the ambassador is responsible for the physical and moral well-being of all personnel under his supervision. Because of the many hostilities which arise among the members of the Soviet colony (see the section entitled Atmosphere in a Soviet Diplomatic Mission), the ambassador frequently finds himself in the position of having to settle petty squabbles over living quarters and minor perquisites; drunken fist fights; vicious name-calling battles among the female staff over work allotments; and similar unpleasantnesses which are part of the routine of Soviet embassy life. The ambassador may choose to form an ad hoc committee from among the staff to investigate one of these "uncultured" transgressions, and order it to report its findings to him; he may refer the matter to the Party committee or the Trade Union committee; or he may settle the affair himself. Whichever action he may take, the ambassador is obliged to spend hours on end listening to complaints, charges and counter-charges. In consonance with the Soviet theoretical principle of equality, all personnel have access to the ambassador for the purpose of airing their grievances. There is no personnel officer per se in a Soviet embassy, although the next-ranking MFA diplomat sometimes serves in this capacity.
- Basing his instructions on directives received from the CC/CPSU and the MFA, the ambassador assigns various tasks

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in the pursuit of Soviet objectives in the host country to his staff. He briefs them at regular intervals, and expects to receive a variety of reports (both written and oral) on various substantive topics, as well as reports on all meetings with foreigners, from them. Since this activity constitutes the principal raison d'etre of the bona fide MFA staff of the embassy, in addition to the work of the ambassador himself in this field, he spends a great deal of time at it, constantly pushing and goading his staff to make more contacts among the local citizenry, to clip more articles from the local press, and to write more and better reports.

- Owing in large measure to a constant shortage of foreign currency in the USSR, every Soviet embassy throughout the world operates on a very strict budget, in consequence of which the ambassador, as principal custodian of the "Soviet people's" money in the embassy, is obliged to review every expenditure made by his staff. (It is understood that neither the ambassador nor any other member of the MFA staff has any right to control or review the accountings of the KGB or GRU rezidenturas. He does, however, have full authority over the expenditures and accountings of the KGB and GRU staff which are made while they are serving in their overt MFA cover jobs.) Thus each ambassador spends hours on end with the embassy bookkeeper, going over her entries, disputing a great many expenditures as being excessive, and urging her not to pay bills tendered her by the staff automatically, but to force them to cut expenses. Every expenditure made by the embassy staff in the host country must, by regulation, be supported by a receipt from the seller, and accompanied by a statement explaining the reason for the expenditure and giving a detailed breakdown of the various items comprising the total cost. As an example of the ludicrous degree to which this regulation is observed, one Soviet ambassador who was having a "representational" suit made on the local market was obliged to forward to Moscow the tailor's bill, itemized — to the last kopek — as to cost of material, cost of buttons, cost of lining and overall cost of labor.
- The ambassador himself may on occasion purchase locally some item for use in the embassy at a "bargain" price and then show it to his staff as an example of how money

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can be saved by shrewd shopping. In this connection, the ambassador will often upbraid the zavkhoz (building-superintendent-cum-supply-officer) for not having shopped about among all local dealers in order to obtain supplies at the best price.

- The ambassador takes a keen interest in all preparations for the representational receptions held on 7 November and 1 May, to which large numbers of foreigners are invited. With regard to the financial expenditures involved in those receptions, the ambassador, usually in the company of the zavkhoz and one of the senior (non-RIS) staff members, reckons the amount of food which each guest can be expected to consume, the type and cost of each hors d'oeuvre to be served, the amount and cost of spirits, wines and liqueurs to be consumed, and so forth. Some ambassadors actually count the number of shots in a standard-sized bottle of Soviet vodka and, based on such reckoning, instruct the zavkhoz to set out just enough bottles to satisfy the minimum anticipated requirements of each guest. Some ambassadors take a personal hand in arranging the furniture placed in the public rooms of the embassy in preparation for receptions, helping to move and shift various pieces "so that the foreigners will be impressed." After such receptions, some ambassadors have been known to go over the inventory of supplies consumed, make note of what they consider to have been wasted or superfluous, and order more careful planning for future receptions.
- The ambassador's intimate concern over possible waste or extravagance on the part of his staff extends also to the overall outfitting and maintenance of the embassy premises and living quarters of the staff; to the maintenance of the embassy motor pool, including POL consumption; and to the general cleanliness of the embassy premises. In certain instances the ambassador personally passes on the acceptability of material to be used for drapes, and on types, sizes and varieties of furniture. (One ambassador carried a tape measure at all times, with which he went about taking the measurements of all rooms in the embassy, in order to be certain that space was not being wasted.) Some ambassadors have discussed at considerable length with their chauffeurs the number of times per month that the ambassador's car should be washed, and which local garage does the best job at the lowest price.

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- The ambassador attends regular meetings of the Party Bureau (the highest organ of the Party in a Soviet colony, usually composed of Party activists from the Party units of the embassy and the Commercial Mission), but seldom holds any title, and votes and participates in discussions as an ordinary member, without obvious reference to his diplomatic rank. There are strong indications, however, that prior to Party meetings he meets with the Presidium of the local Party bureau, and with them decides on the agenda to be presented to the meeting. The ambassador and several of the prominent Party activists in the embassy and Commercial Mission have been known to agree on the choice of a new secretary of the Party Bureau, whose name is then proposed to the appropriate section of the CC/CPSU and if accepted by it "democratically" nominated at the next scheduled meeting and, of course, elected.
- While the ambassador often meets with the leaders of Communist Parties in host countries where the Party is legal, it is believed that such meetings are usually only formal in nature, and that whatever control is exercised by the CPSU over local Communist Parties is more often carried out by members of the KGB rezidentura or by delegates from the Foreign Department of the CC/CPSU under official cover in the host country than by the ambassador. The relationship of the Soviet ambassador to the Communist Parties in Bloc countries is not covered here.
- The ambassador usually makes a point of inviting the heads of various Soviet delegations visiting the host country to call on him, and debriefs them on their impressions of the host country, and seeks to learn from them how what they have observed can be utilized by the embassy in its work among the locals. The ambassador also carefully attempts to elicit information concerning changes in Moscow, and at the same time attempts to impress his visitor (especially if the visitor is a person of importance in the Soviet hierarchy) with the success of the embassy's work, in the obvious hope that the visitor will take back a favorable report to Moscow.
- The ambassador must personally supervise the preparation of the annual budget, which is forwarded to the finance division of the MFA over his signature, and is responsible for the content of the Annual Report. Much of the work

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with which the Soviet ambassador concerns himself is trivial in the extreme, and while many ambassadors are extremely annoyed at having to do it, others seem to be completely at home in a sea of bureaucratic trivia. Such detailed attention appears to be necessary, however, for the sense of responsibility often appears to rest very lightly on the shoulders of many of those referred to in Soviet terminology as "diplomatic workers." There is widespread confirmation that in some embassies, if the ambassador does not constantly check on the work of even his lowest subordinates, goading, prodding and pushing his staff to do a thorough job, the work at best will be done sloppily and at worst not at all. In consonance with international diplomatic practice, when the ambassador returns to the Soviet Union on normal leave or for consultation, the embassy is headed by a charge d'affaires ad interim, who is usually the senior counselor of embassy and is sometimes the KGB resident. While in principle the charge performs the same functions as an ambassador, both within the embassy and without, in fact he often has considerably less authority. There have been instances where a charge has not acted firmly towards the embassy staff, discipline has deteriorated badly and near-chaos has resulted.

d. Relations with the KGB Rezidentura

Approximately half of the Soviet ambassadors serving abroad as of 1 January 1965 have intelligence backgrounds. Some served in the KI (Komitet Informatsii — Committee of Information), others were staff officers of either the KGB (or its predecessor organizations) or the GRU, while still others were co-opted at some point during their careers by one or the other service. Some retain, as ambassadors, their formal affiliation with the organs of Soviet Intelligence, and even if they do not, they are intimately aware of the importance of the overall position of the organs of Soviet Intelligence, and most are prepared to accept the fact that the staffs of the KGB and GRU rezidenturas, while nominally under the authority of the ambassador, are in fact independent of that authority while engaged in strictly operational activity.

In his book, Inside a Soviet Embassy, Aleksandr Kaznacheyev described the relationship between the ambassador and the KGB resident as being at best formal and at worst hostile. Kaznacheyev wrote that the KGB resident refused to show the

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ambassador in Burma any reports received by the KGB rezidentura from clandestine sources, a situation which the ambassador was powerless to change.

Petrov, who was temporary KGB rezident in Australia at the time of his defection in 1954, noted that he was forbidden by KGB headquarters to show his ambassador any KGB traffic, or to brief him with regard to any KGB activities in Australia. Petrov also stated that the extremely hostile attitude of the ambassador towards Petrov and the latter's wife, who was also a KGB officer, contributed to their decision to defect.

The implications of the statements of both Petrov and Kaznacheyev are, inter alia, that the KGB rezidentura is totally independent of the ambassador, whose resulting hostile attitude towards the rezident may at times lead to the latter's recall. While we continue to regard the statements of both Petrov and Kaznacheyev as having been true at the time they made them, there is considerable evidence in more recent years showing that the present-day Soviet ambassador is kept well briefed by the KGB rezident as to the work of his rezidentura; and that the ambassador, in turn, respects the work of the rezidentura and gets on well with the rezident. This can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that so many ambassadors have intelligence backgrounds themselves which was believed not to be the case in the earlier period. More important, however, is the increasingly important role which the organs of Soviet Intelligence, particularly the KGB, have assumed during the past decade in the execution of Soviet foreign policy — to the point today where RIS personnel occupy most of the diplomatic slots of Soviet missions outside the Bloc. The ambassador is thus obliged to rely heavily on them, both to ensure that the overt work of the mission is accomplished and for advice and guidance on matters of political work in the host country.

Since his relationship depends so much on the personality and background of both parties, no valid generalizations can be made. Some recent examples may, however, assist an understanding:

- An ambassador told his staff that no matter what their other tasks might be, all had one task in common — the procurement of information. The ambassador emphasized that it was their principal task to procure information. Analysis of the activities of the embassy involved showed clearly that the ambassador meant both the collection of overt and semi-overt information by the bona fide MFA staff, and the clandestine collection of

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covert information by both the KGB and GRU rezidenturas.

- An ambassador informed a newly-arrived KGB rezident that the latter, a first secretary, was expected to perform a definite MFA job during his tour with the embassy. He instructed the rezident to take his time before deciding on the cover position which he would fill, but once having chosen it, to do a thorough job. He noted that the rezident's predecessor had drifted from one MFA cover job to another while assigned to the embassy, thus drawing the attention of local counter-intelligence to himself, and incurring the hostility of members of the non-RIS embassy staff.
- An ambassador insisted that the KGB rezident and his staff do more MFA work, particularly in the fields of political and economic reporting. The rezident agreed that they could do more MFA reporting than they had been doing, but said that there were definite limits to the amount of MFA work which they could do, reminding the ambassador that the KGB rezidentura had its own carefully defined tasks.
- A KGB staff officer under embassy cover informed an ambassador that he and another KGB staffer were obliged to return to Moscow on TDY within a week's time, and asked the ambassador that neither be given any MFA work prior to their departure. The ambassador, who knew nothing of the trip and was short-handed at the time, was annoyed but reluctantly agreed. The ambassador asked no questions concerning the purpose of the trip, which was for the purpose of consultation at KGB headquarters.
- Following the arrival of a newly-assigned KGB staffer who had MFA cover, the rezident complained to the ambassador that the man had been assigned to cover work in the consulate, and that such work would not permit the new staffer either enough free time or access to locals of interest, to fulfill his KGB assignment. The KGB rezident asked that the staffer be assigned instead to the cultural section of the embassy, to which the ambassador agreed.
- A KGB rezident told his ambassador about a developmental operation in which he was involved, naming the prospective agent and describing the type of information to

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which he had access. The KGB rezident thereafter continued to brief the ambassador on the progress of the developmental operation, and gave the ambassador a precis of information which he had obtained from the agent. Another KGB rezident informed the charge ad interim that he had been ordered by KGB headquarters to cultivate two local citizens, whom he named, and yet another informed his ambassador of an operational plan involving the planned recruitment of a highly-placed local citizen by two staffers of his rezidentura, naming all concerned. Another KGB rezident, however, who, preparing to return to Moscow PCS, informed the ambassador that certain of his agent assets would be turned over to members of his rezidentura. Although the rezident did not give the ambassador the names of the agents — nor did the ambassador ask for them — the rezident identified the subordinates who would take them over, and gave the ambassador the names of the cities in which the agents lived.

- Some KGB rezidents prove to be more cautious of walk-ins than their ambassadors. One told his ambassador about several, one of whom claimed to have material of intelligence interest to the USSR. The rezident had feared provocation and refused to touch the material which the man offered, and sent him away. The ambassador commented that the rezident should not have been so hasty, as the walk-in might have had material of genuine interest. The rezident defended his action weakly. Another KGB rezident informed an ambassador of a letter which had been received from a person living in the host country who claimed to have secret information which he would give to the Soviets. The KGB officer feared that the letter was a provocation, but the ambassador (a genuine MFA man) told the KGB officer to reply to the letter and invite its writer to the embassy in order to determine what it was that the man had.
- The KGB rezident keeps his ambassador informed of security matters. One rezident had received reports that a member of the embassy's non-diplomatic staff had been spending a considerable amount of time alone in the capital city in an embassy vehicle. The rezident informed the ambassador that the man's movements must be controlled and his actions carefully observed. The ambassador agreed without comment. Another informed his ambassador that a

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member of the embassy staff and his wife appeared to be succumbing to "bourgeois temptations." The rezident noted that he was watching the pair carefully and would order their return to the USSR unless clear evidence was developed that their attitudes had changed for the better. The ambassador gave the rezident full permission to do what he wished. A third KGB rezident informed his ambassador that an engineer assigned TDY to a Soviet Technical Aid Program project had been causing trouble by his excessive drinking and chasing the wives of Soviets assigned to the project. The rezident reported to the ambassador that he had not yet recommended to KGB headquarters that the man be recalled, since the engineer's derelictions thus far had been confined to Soviet-controlled buildings and could not have been observed by local counterintelligence. The rezident stated that there was no point at that time to informing KGB headquarters of the man's actions, as the rezident's KGB superiors would only instruct him to settle the matter on the spot.

- A KGB rezident complained to his ambassador that the latter had been inviting the first secretary (a bona fide MFA officer) and not him, the rezident, to receptions given by host-country citizens and other foreigners. The rezident noted that the ambassador's failure to invite the rezident was decreasing the rezident's access to foreigners of potential value.
- A KGB rezident informed his ambassador that a staff officer of the rezidentura had just received a cover promotion within the MFA. The rezident noted that the recommendation for promotion had been made by him, the rezident, in light of the staffer's long service in the host country.
- An ambassador (an MFA officer with no known RIS connections) requested an acting KGB rezident, who had a good knowledge of the local language, to translate a newspaper article into Russian. The KGB officer declined, protesting that he was already too busy with other work, whereupon the ambassador ordered him to do the translation immediately.
- An ambassador requested to see the KGB rezidentura file on the activities of an anti-Soviet organization in the host country. The file was brought to him by an officer

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of the rezidentura, who then answered the ambassador's questions concerning details contained in the file.

- A KGB rezident informed his ambassador of a problem of recontacting a developmental agent candidate who had been in contact with a previous KGB rezident. The ambassador, an MFA officer with no known RIS affiliations, offered certain suggestions which were incorporated into the KGB staffer's recontact plan.
- One KGB rezident fawned on his ambassador, a man of considerable prestige in high Party circles; he praised the ambassador fulsomely and congratulated him constantly on the success of his mission in the host country (falsely, since the ambassador had been a boor, hated by many of his staff because of his abusive treatment of them, and regarded by host-country officials as an ignoramus). In turn the ambassador in question was very friendly with the KGB rezident, whose confidence and advice he sought, to the detriment of the GRU rezident, who was barely civil to the ambassador. After receiving a note from the host foreign office concerning alleged espionage activities on the part of a member of the Soviet colony, this same KGB rezident and his ambassador concluded that neither knew anything about it and that it was a GRU operation. The KGB rezident took the opportunity to disparage GRU methods of operation.
- In other instances the relationship between ambassador and KGB rezident (and in his absence, charge) has been of a more formal nature, yet even in these cases it has been obvious that the rezident has striven constantly to gain and hold the respect and good will of the ambassador; and it is equally obvious that the ambassador respected the work of the KGB rezidentura, even though there may not have been a warm relationship between the two men.

e. Relations with the GRU Rezidentura

In brief, the KGB rezidentura abroad is responsible for the collection of clandestine political intelligence, the conducting of covert political action programs, and for the security of all Soviet installations and personnel. The GRU rezidentura, on the other hand, is responsible for the gathering of strategic military intelligence, and bears no overall responsibility for physical and personnel security. The fact of these

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differences in responsibilities, particularly the KGB responsibilities in the political field and its overall responsibility for internal security, normally leads to a closer relationship between the KGB rezidentura and the ambassador than between the ambassador and the GRU rezidentura. The ambassador's primary concern in the formation and execution of Soviet foreign policy lies in the political field, and he bears the overall responsibility for the personal and political lives of all Soviet citizens under him. Thus, as indicated above, the ambassador usually consults and seeks the advice of the KGB rezident much more often than that of the GRU rezident.

The following examples illustrate certain aspects of the ambassador/GRU rezidentura relationship:

- An ambassador complained to the KGB rezident that the GRU rezident and his staff were reporting no information to him, the ambassador.
- During a meeting of the diplomatic staff of a Soviet embassy, the ambassador noted that the ambassador of a Bloc country in the host capital had pressed the Soviet ambassador to have the GRU rezident provide the Bloc ambassador with intelligence information. The ambassador had refused to do this and also noted that the GRU rezident had flatly refused to give any information whatsoever to the Bloc embassy in question. The counselor of the Soviet embassy added that the GRU rezident had no information to give in any case.
- A GRU staffer gave the ambassador a briefing on the state of military preparedness of the host country. The information was based largely on overt sources, with a small amount from agents. The ambassador sent a summary report to Moscow based on this briefing.
- A newly-arrived deputy GRU rezident informed the charge of his plans for a reception to be given at the embassy, to which the deputy had invited the military intelligence chiefs of the host country. The deputy rezident gave the charge no details of the reception, nor did he solicit the charge's comments or advice.
- A GRU rezident informed an ambassador that the deputy rezident was under constant surveillance by the host

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security service; that he was denied subscriptions to certain host-country publications on military subjects; and that he was denied access to strategic military areas to which Western attaches were granted entry.

- After receiving a directive through MFA channels, an ambassador assigned a GRU officer the task of obtaining information on host-country policies and reactions to Soviet proposals on the halting of nuclear weapons testing and on a proposed non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact nations and NATO. In another country in Europe, a GRU officer briefed his ambassador on GRU requirements concerning the creation of a European nuclear force.
- A GRU officer briefed his ambassador on how he handled several walk-ins.
- A GRU staff officer informed his ambassador that he had received a requirement from GRU headquarters to collect biographical data, including information on hobbies and other interests, on all leading officers and officials of the host-country Ministry of Defense.
- A GRU rezident asked his ambassador to relieve a member of the GRU rezidentura from certain embassy duties, which the staffer had refused to perform. The ambassador instead ordered the staffer to perform the duties and when the staffer continued to refuse, ordered him to return to Moscow immediately. Eventually the ambassador was forced to withdraw his order, and the GRU staffer completed his tour.

Observations and comments concerning the participation of the KGB and GRU rezidenturas in the overt work of the embassy, as well as in the internal life of the colony, will be found in subsequent paragraphs.

f. The Ambassador's Personal Staff

The ambassador's personal staff consists of a male secretary/interpreter, a female secretary (sometimes referred to in larger Soviet embassies as zavkants /zaveduyushchyi kantse-larii/or chief of the ambassador's secretariat), a chauffeur and a cook.

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(1) The Secretary/Interpreter: The ambassador's male secretary/interpreter is often a young man, married, who is a recent graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (IIR) or similar institution of higher learning, and who has a good working knowledge of the principal language of the host country. The principal duties of this man, who often holds the diplomatic rank of attache or third secretary, are to translate articles of interest in the foreign press for the ambassador, and to serve as his interpreter. In addition, the secretary/interpreter often functions as the embassy's protocol officer, arranging all appointments with officials of the host foreign office and with prominent citizens. (In larger posts one man is not sufficient to handle all the work required, and the Soviet embassy often has a special Protocol Section, staffed by junior MFA officers.) The position of secretary/interpreter to the ambassador provides access to foreigners of interest, and is thus attractive to the RIS. Many who have held this position have been identified as active intelligence officers, but many are known to be non-RIS and appear to have been superior errand boys, chosen largely because of their knowledge of the local language. In view of the Soviet system of internal security, some of these men are likely to be KGB co-optees, perhaps under orders to observe the actions and movements of their ambassadors, among other things.

The ambassador's female secretary performs the usual duties of typing reports in final form (but not cables, which are written by hand by the ambassador and turned over directly by him to the chief MFA code clerk), sorting and delivering to him the ambassador's mail, and filing and maintaining copies of all correspondence between the embassy and various ministries of the host government. Whether she is the wife of an embassy staffer hired locally or is a secretary assigned from the MFA, this woman often has at least a reading knowledge of the principal language of the host country.

(2) Ambassador's Chauffeur and Cook: Theoretically, each Soviet ambassador is assigned a personal chauffeur and a cook. In practice, the chauffeur — and the ambassador's personal vehicle — are often shared with other members of the diplomatic staff, especially in small embassies (i.e., usually with bona fide MFA

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staffers; the KGB and GRU residents and their operational staff have their own vehicles). The ambassador's chauffeur is also often chief of the embassy motor pool, and as such is responsible for the care and maintenance of the embassy vehicles. The chauffeur usually has no knowledge of foreign languages and no RIS affiliation, although he may be a KGB agent, of course. He is always a Soviet national.

The ambassador's cook, whether man or woman, is often in charge of the embassy mess, where a large percentage of the staff take their meals, and does not cook for the ambassador alone. The staff cook is always a Soviet national, though local cooks may be employed from time to time, usually in preparation for the 7 November and 1 May celebrations.

2. The Substantive Sections of a Soviet Diplomatic Mission

The substantive sections of a Soviet diplomatic mission abroad, that is, those sections with which foreigners deal and which are directly concerned with the implementation of Soviet foreign policy in the host country, are: the Political Section, the Cultural Section, the Press and Information Section, the Office of the Economic Counselor, the Consular Section, the Scientific and Technical Section, and the Office of the Military Attache. Of these several elements, only the Political Section and the Consular Section in their overt work are concerned with diplomatic work in the traditional Western sense, and only the Political, Consular and certain elements of the Press and Information Section can be regarded as being organizational elements of the MFA, the other sections falling under the ultimate authority of one or another ministry or State committee in Moscow. The Soviet ambassador has direct, immediate authority over only the Political, Consular and certain parts of the Press and Information Section. His authority over the other sections, while significant, is more or less on the order of coordinator of their activities, whose principal concern is that they serve the best interests of the Soviet State.

Collectively all sections of the Soviet diplomatic mission are responsible for the greater part of the overt work of all Soviet missions abroad, which is the promotion of the overt CPSU propaganda line, and covertly they provide the principal cover vehicle for the clandestine operations of the legal RIS residencuras in any given non-Bloc country. (A full description of

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overt work of a Soviet embassy will be given below, as will a description of the participation of the RIS rezidenturas therein.)

Set out below is each section, with a description of its overt functions. The staffing pattern of a Soviet embassy is, however, flexible — not to say confused and often chaotic — to the extent that it is often impossible to state with any degree of certainty that a diplomatic officer known six months ago to be assigned to the Political Section and doing political work, is not now doing cultural or press work, and will appear shortly to be engaged in economic analysis. The picture is further confused by the fact that the rezidentura staffs are known to change their cover jobs, sometimes on order of the ambassador to suit the requirements of new MFA directives, and sometimes in answer to changing requirements from KGB and GRU headquarters. With certain specific exceptions such as those involving officers with specialized training who are detailed to the MFA and posted abroad for a specific task (e.g., men from the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries), experienced MFA personnel are regarded as being capable of carrying out any overt task in any one of the embassy's fields of work. The Soviet ambassador is far more interested in seeing that directives from Moscow are carried out than in concerning himself with which section of the embassy staff does the job.

a. The Political Section

Universally the largest element of the Soviet diplomatic mission, the Political Section is responsible for: maintaining contact with the host-country foreign ministry; exchanging diplomatic notes and aides memoires with it and with other elements of the host government; maintaining contact and conducting similar "traditional" diplomatic business with the political life of the host country, which includes establishing and maintaining contact with members of the host-country legislative bodies and leading members of the significant political parties, whether they be of the left, center or right; and for maintaining contact with the personnel of other foreign diplomatic missions in the host country.

The Political Section is also responsible for observing and reporting on changes and events in the political life of the host country, both internally and with regard to the effect which such changes and events may have on the external relations between

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the host country, the USSR and other major power blocs.

The Political Section of a Soviet embassy is headed by a counselor or first secretary who is often the KGB rezident, and the staff itself is composed almost entirely of RIS officers, with a thin scattering of MFA diplomats. By Soviet standards the RIS officers assigned to the Political Section of an embassy are considered to be able to carry on their overt duties in the same manner as their MFA colleagues, and in fact many of them in recent years have been superficially indistinguishable in manner, dress and appearance from their Western (non-intelligence) colleagues. Aside from their training in RIS schools, the great majority of the staff of the Political Section appear to be graduates of institutes of higher learning such as the Institute of International Relations, Moscow State University, etc.

b. The Cultural Section

As its title indicates, this section is responsible for establishing and increasing cultural relations between the USSR and the host country. This work obviously has many aspects, but among its more common manifestations are continuing attempts to persuade officials of the host government and of influential, respected private and semi-private organizations to visit the USSR and to sponsor visits to the host country of Soviet musical artists, ballet and folk-dance groups, cosmonauts and similar persons and groups which can be expected to produce a high propaganda impact.

The Cultural Section is also active in the field of youth and student activity, propagandizing the alleged superiority of the Soviet education system; and among the youth of the under-developed countries of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, persuading them to pursue their studies in the USSR, principally at the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University. Within the host country, the Cultural Section frequently sponsors or subsidizes study groups and formal classes in Russian language and literature, delivers lectures on Soviet scientific and artistic accomplishments, shows films extolling the virtues of Soviet civilization, etc. It also makes arrangements with host-country authorities whereby Soviet professors and teachers instruct at local schools and universities.

In those countries where the host country/Soviet Friendship Society is well-established or shows promise of attracting a

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significant segment of the local population, one of the principal duties of the Cultural Section is to maintain intimate contact with the leaders of the society, providing them with funds, political guidance, literature and films. The Cultural Section also sponsors travel to the USSR of groups and individuals who are members or supporters of the local Friendship Society.

The Cultural Section is usually headed by an official of diplomatic rank (counselor and first secretary are most common) who is attached to the diplomatic mission from the headquarters of the State Committee of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (GKSZ). In some cases these men claim to have worked at the Moscow headquarters of the Soviet end of the host country/ USSR Friendship Society, and in fact some of them do have a good knowledge of the cultural and political life of the host country — somewhat of a phenomenon among Soviets serving abroad. Most of them are RIS officers who employ this type of cover because of the wide access which it gives to the important intelligence stratum of host-country society.

c. The Press and Information Section

Although not organized in a formal sense, there exists in many Soviet missions throughout the world a Press and Information Section which, in fact, coordinates the work of the several Soviet press and propaganda elements which are to be found in most countries, i.e., the Press Section of the embassy proper, and the representatives of Novosti (also known by the initials of its formal title, APN), TASS, Pravda, Izvestia, Radio Moscow, etc. It is often difficult to define the precise duties of each of these elements, since they obviously overlap on many occasions.

- The Press Section: Depending on the political climate of the country, this section may be a large one, with coordination responsibility for a huge propaganda effort, and headed by an official of counselor rank, down to a few persons headed by a third secretary or attache. The overt responsibilities of this section are to make and maintain contact with the local press corps, both host country and foreign, to influence them to print stories favorable to the USSR, to elicit from them overt and semi-overt information and to pass out official embassy press releases. They also maintain contact with the host-country foreign ministry, and make

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continuing surveys of the host-country press for the purpose of gathering information of interest to the USSR. This section publishes the embassy press bulletin, which is distributed to the host government, press media, foreign embassies and local citizens.

- Novosti (APN — Agenstvo Pechati Novosti): Under the authority of the Council of Ministers of the Supreme Soviet, Novosti is a major propaganda organ of the CC/CPSU, especially in underdeveloped areas, although it maintains offices in almost every country which maintains diplomatic relations with the USSR. Nominally an "unofficial" agency, Novosti took over the work of SOVINFORMBYURO in 1961.

In general terms, Novosti concentrates on supplying background information and feature articles on various aspects of Soviet life, and gathers news stories on general trends abroad which are used as background material for one or another propaganda theme in the Soviet press. However much the activities of the Novosti correspondents may vary from country to country, in every country of the world which permits publication, Novosti publishes a magazine, or bulletin, which is variously entitled in the local tongue, or tongues, "Soviet Life," "USSR Today" or some variation of these two. Where possible, this magazine is published in a great number of copies and in all the major tongues and dialects of the country. All articles to be included in a specific issue are sent from Moscow, usually in Russian and are translated into the local language, usually by local employees, a clear majority of whom are members of the pro-Soviet wing of the local Communist Party, or are Communist sympathizers. The magazine is also printed in the host country.

Despite the "non-official" status of Novosti, many of those Soviets engaged in Novosti work hold diplomatic rank, and in some areas the Novosti offices are in the embassy itself or in the embassy compound. In other areas, the Novosti correspondents carry service passports and enjoy no diplomatic immunity. While those Soviets engaged in the purely technical aspects of Novosti work, e.g., supervising the trans-

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lators or preparing press mats, are usually not RIS personnel, those who deal regularly with other foreigners often are.

Novosti in its overt work does not normally use the embassy channels of communication to maintain contact with Moscow, but rather the local telegraph and telephone services. It is funded directly from its headquarters in Moscow through deposits in host-country banks.

- TASS (Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union): The oldest of the Soviet news agencies, TASS is the official wire service of the Soviet government and has representatives in every country which recognizes the USSR. Its overt responsibility abroad is daily news coverage, which its correspondents transmit to Moscow headquarters directly by open wire, TWX or telephone. In the USSR, TASS distributes foreign news to the Moscow and provincial press, and sells news stories to the foreign press abroad, much in the manner of Western wire services. In most major capitals of the world there are several TASS correspondents and often several locally-hired office personnel and stringers, all of whom are either members of the host-country Communist Party or known left-wingers. The TASS office is almost always situated away from the Soviet diplomatic installation.

TASS, like Novosti, is funded directly from Moscow through deposits in local banks, and does not use embassy communications channels in its overt work. TASS cover is widely utilized by the RIS because it affords normal overt contact with a wide variety of foreign citizens, much greater freedom of movement than that usually accorded to diplomats, housing outside the embassy compound or installation, and a great comparability of normal cover duties with RIS targets. It is currently estimated that between 60 and 70 percent of all TASS correspondents are RIS officers; most, if not all, of the others are co-opted agents of the RIS.

TASS correspondents, like the correspondents of the other Soviet press services, enjoy a considerable degree of independence from the Soviet embassy,

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although they sometimes contribute information to the various reports prepared by the embassy and are all members of the Party organization of the embassy rather than of the Commercial Mission. They are subject to the same discipline as all other Party members serving abroad.

- Pravda, Izvestia, Radio Moscow, etc: Correspondents of these entities are to be found in far fewer foreign countries than are the representatives of TASS and Novosti — usually only in the major world capitals. Their overt work appears to be the same as that of TASS correspondents, i.e., gathering daily news stories which are transmitted through public channels to Moscow. In fact, it is difficult to determine precisely how the overt work of these correspondents differs from that of TASS personnel. As in the case of the other correspondents, these men are funded from Moscow through local banks and are quite independent of control by the local Soviet embassy, except for their participation in the Party activities of the embassy. Many of these men are known to be RIS officers.

Often when a major propaganda drive has been ordered by the CC/CPSU, all Soviet correspondents and newsmen gather at the Soviet embassy in the host country and coordinate the campaign which is to be carried out locally. While each representative present may pursue a separate plan of attack, the overt line given by all is invariably the same and the overall effort is closely coordinated.

d. The Office of the Counselor for Economic Affairs

This section of a Soviet mission is to be found only in those countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East in which there are active Soviet economic, technical and military aid programs. In brief, the Office of the Counselor for Economic Affairs administers and supervises the various military and civilian aid agreements which were previously signed at the governmental level in Moscow.

In the field, the overall aid program is headed by an official of the State Committee of Foreign Economic Relations (GKES), who holds the diplomatic rank of counselor, and is staffed by

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civilian officials from GKES and from those Soviet ministries concerned with dam and road construction, heavy industrial plant building (refineries, steel mills, and so forth); and by military officers who train the armed forces of the host country in the use of the various types of military equipment supplied to that country under the terms of the agreement.

Negotiations concerning the sale and delivery of armaments and spare parts are the responsibility of the so-called "General Engineering Department" of the Office of the Counselor for Economic Affairs. The "General Engineering Department" is usually headed by a man who holds the diplomatic rank of first secretary but who is, in fact, a military officer of the rank of colonel or higher, who is directly responsible to the Soviet Ministry of Defense, although he is officially subordinate to the Economic Affairs Office.

The Office of Military Personnel, which supplies military experts for the Soviet military aid program in the host country, is staffed by Soviets who openly hold military rank. In the execution of its tasks it appears to have a close working relationship with the "General Engineering Department" of the Office of the Counselor for Economic Affairs, although it also appears to have a direct line of communications with the Ministry of Defense in Moscow.

The precise role of the Soviet ambassador in the field of economic, technical and military aid is unknown, although since he is responsible to the CC/CPSU for all Soviet activity in the host country (except intelligence operations per se), it is assumed that he has some degree of coordinating authority over these activities. We also lack precise information regarding the extent to which the Counselor for Economic Affairs has access to the communications system of the Soviet embassy, or whether he and the various elements of his office use them at all.

In those countries which do not have Soviet aid programs, reporting on the economic life of the host country is the responsibility of an element of the Political Section of the embassy, specifically of one or two officers assigned to gather, analyze and report developments in the internal and external economic life of the country. It is extremely difficult to determine at any given time which officers hold this responsibility, since in many areas it appears to be borne by a variety of men assigned officially to the Political Section who claim

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to have other functions as well, while in other areas men with apparently good academic backgrounds in economics have the responsibility. In any case, those charged with economic reporting prepare the Economic Section of the Annual Report, in collaboration with the Commercial Mission.

e. The Consular Section and Soviet Consulates

The Consular Section is responsible for processing the visa applications of all foreigners desiring to visit the USSR; for protecting the legal rights of Soviet citizens in the host country, which includes assuring that the interests of Soviet citizens involved in actions covered by local civil and criminal codes receive maximum protection; for notifying the host foreign office of the arrival and departure of all Soviet diplomatic couriers; and for processing the requests of persons desiring repatriation to the USSR or seeking information thereon.

With the exception of a few consular installations, all consular positions are held by RIS staff officers, overwhelmingly KGB with one or two overt MFA Consular Department officers and GRU officers sometimes included in larger posts. The fact that the Consular Section is the focal point for the processing of visas makes it of paramount interest to the KGB since the biographical information required for submission in a visa application provides the KGB excellent opportunities, both in the host country and in the USSR, for spotting persons with family, business or personal reasons for contact with or travel to the USSR. Among other things, for example, the Consular Section is responsible for assuring that bequests made by deceased foreigners to their relatives in the USSR are properly handled. In the process, the consular officials have occasional access to pertinent local records which can be of value in illegals work. In those areas where there exist groups with significant ties to one or another ethnic group in the USSR, i.e., emigres, the goals of consular work are four-fold: to spot, assess and recruit agents; to spot and neutralize the work of anti-Soviet emigre individuals and groups; to encourage repatriation to the USSR; and to promote pro-USSR attitudes among the whole group.

The Consular Section affords the KGB special opportunities in the field of SK (Sovetskaya Koloniya — Soviet Colony) work. The passports of all Soviets stationed in the area are held by the Consular Section, and all Soviets visiting the host country for over 30 days are obliged to report to the Consular Section for registration on arrival and for deregistration on departure.

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The KGB rezidentura is notified by its headquarters of the impending arrival of all Soviet citizens from Moscow, and probably from other parts of the world as well.

In addition to its other duties, overt and covert, the Consular Section is responsible for notifying the appropriate section of the host foreign office of the arrival and departure of all diplomatic couriers; for organizing parties to escort the couriers to and from their points of arrival and departure (the escorts are drawn from the entire diplomatic staff, by roster, and courier escort duty by itself is no certain indication of RIS affiliation); and for providing board and lodging for the couriers — usually in a room in the embassy set aside for that specific purpose — while they are in the host country. In fact, it appears that the Consular Section, except for providing logistical support, has little to do with the couriers who, on arrival, report directly to the chief of the referentura, turn their pouches over to him and receive from him all diplomatic mail prior to departure. All regular diplomatic couriers, that is those men who are not RIS officers traveling abroad on special missions under diplomatic courier cover, are employees of the Tenth Department of the MFA, thus their nominal superior in an embassy is the chief of the referentura, which is under the control of the Tenth Department.

There is often a feeling of resentment on the part of the rest of the diplomatic staff against the members of the consulate based on the allegation that the consulate staff does not participate in the work of the embassy proper, and that since the consulate is open for only a few hours a day (a few hours a week in those countries where there is little travel to and from the USSR), there is little work to do anyway. On the contrary, in those countries where travel of local citizens to the USSR is heavy, the consulate is very busy, the requirements of Soviet bureaucracy being most exacting as to the filling in of forms, making large numbers of copies, and so forth. In fact, it is likely that in large consulates, which handle a heavy volume of normal consular business, one of the staff is a bona fide MFA officer who is chosen because of his knowledge of bureaucratic practice in Soviet and host-country consular law; and that it is he who does the bulk of the desk work in the Soviet consulate.

It is unlikely that any officer of a Soviet diplomatic installation abroad in recent years has had, or now has, the authority to issue a Soviet entry visa on the spot without reference to Moscow. We are aware of certain cases where the ambassador, for

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political reasons, has urged the rapid issuance of a visa to a prominent local citizen, and other cases where the KGB rezident has urged his headquarters not to permit the issuance of a visa to an applicant known to the rezident to be anti-Soviet; but we know of no instance where the ultimate right of approval or disapproval has rested with any embassy officer.

f. Office of the Military Attache

With rare exceptions, all persons assigned to the Office of the Military Attache in a Soviet diplomatic installation are officers or employees of Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). In 1961 General Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, the commanding officer of the GRU at the time, ordered that the GRU rezident abroad take a civilian-type cover position with diplomatic rank; and that henceforth the military attache was no longer to be the rezident, but subordinate to him. However, Serov has long since departed the scene and in certain instances during the last several years the military attache has been an active agent handler, and probably rezident as well.

In their overt capacity, the military attache and his staff seek to establish and maintain contact with the defense establishment of the host country, and with the military attaches of Western nations located in the host country. During these contacts, which are made for the ostensible purpose of maintaining military/diplomatic relations, the Soviet attache and his staff gather biographic and vulnerability data on their contacts, with the ultimate aim of recruitment. Again in their ostensibly overt capacity, the Soviet attache and his staff conduct strategic intelligence surveys of the host country, gather overt military and scientific-technical journals and periodicals, observe and photograph military installations, and so forth.

In addition to its other cover work, the GRU rezidentura, functioning in this instance as the Office of the Military Attache, contributes to the embassy's Annual Report.

The Military Attache's apparatus is usually funded in separate bank transfers from the Ministry of Defense to local banks, and prepares separate pouches or separate portions of the overall embassy diplomatic pouch.

g. Scientific and Technical Section

Openly identified scientific and technical sections

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are to be found in very few Soviet diplomatic missions. Ostensibly established for the purpose of gathering and exchanging with host-country groups overt technical and scientific data, these sections are under the direct supervision of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) and are in fact staffed entirely by KGB and GRU S&T officers and co-optees.

3. The Commercial Mission (TORGPREDSTVO)

The Commercial or Trade Mission of a Soviet diplomatic mission abroad is not an integral part of the Soviet embassy in the functional sense, being an element of the overseas representation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT). Wherever a clearly identifiable Commercial Mission is present in the host country, it is headed by a man called the "Torgpred" (i.e., "Trade Representative"), who often holds the diplomatic rank of counselor, who is usually a genuine expert in the field of foreign trade and often has a long history of professional activity in this field, both in the USSR and abroad. (Some Field Stations and Bases confuse the chief of the Commercial Mission, the Torgpred, with the Mission itself, the TORGPREDSTVO. For the sake of clarity, the English translations are used here.) Both the Commercial chief and his staff, in the pursuit of their overt duties, are largely free from the authority of the ambassador, whose role in the field of Soviet commercial activity in the host country is limited to ascertaining that it is in full consonance with current political directives of the CC/CPSU. According to official Soviet sources, no substantive disagreements between the Commercial chief and the ambassador may be settled in the field, but must be referred to Moscow for arbitration.

Although the Commercial chief himself is seldom an RIS officer, his deputy very often is; some deputies have been known to be the GRU rezidents.

The Commercial Mission is staffed by representatives of some 30 All-Union foreign trade associations, each of which was formed for the purpose of dealing in specific items, for instance: Inturist; Stankoimport (import and export of machine tools and similar equipment); Tekhmashimport (import and export of equipment and machinery for the chemical, rubber, synthetic fiber and similar industries); Sudoimport (import and export of ships and maritime equipment); Eksportkhleb (import and export of grains and grain side-products); Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga (exports books, periodicals, sheet music, etc.) Obviously not all of

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these 30-odd associations are represented at any one post, the natural resources and industries of the host country being the determining factor. Often a single official represents two or more of the foreign trade associations.

The daily work of the Commercial Mission is concerned, in general terms, with negotiating for the sale of Soviet goods in the local market, and for the purchase of a great variety of locally-made items for use in the USSR. As this activity gives wide entree to the industrial and business worlds of the host country, and particularly to economic areas of strategic and scientific interest, Commercial Mission cover is widely utilized by both the KGB and the GRU.

The Commercial Mission is funded directly from the MFT in Moscow and does not use embassy channels for this overt purpose. It uses overt communications facilities for all overt traffic, but must use the communications facilities of the embassy, both cipher and courier systems, for classified traffic. The MFT has its own cipher system and code clerks, who are to be found at almost every large post abroad. The MFT code clerks work in the embassy referentura and are subject to the same rigid discipline as their MFA, KGB and GRU colleagues. No instance has yet been reported of a Commercial Mission, even those located miles from the embassy, having its own referentura, although it seems likely that facilities for the safekeeping of classified documents may exist.

The Commercial chief is expected to keep the ambassador briefed on the activity of the Commercial Mission and, of course, the staff of the Commercial Mission is subject to the discipline of the Party Bureau, which is located in the embassy. The relationship between the Commercial chief and the ambassador varies from post to post, of course. Certain Soviet ambassadors have been known to complain that the Commercial Mission was not supplying to the embassy information on the economic life of the country which it alone had, and was not contributing significantly to the economic section of the embassy's Annual Report.

4. Administrative Elements

a. The Administrative Section

Although no part of a Soviet diplomatic mission is clearly labeled "The Administrative Section," for purposes of organization all non-diplomatic logistics and other administrative

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personnel are placed in this category in this study. All personnel in this category, insofar as their overt duties are concerned, are under the direct supervision of the ambassador, who has a particularly close working relationship with the zavkhoz and the bookkeeper. In those instances where the embassy is a very large one and the ambassador is not as immediately concerned with the daily housekeeping routine as in smaller installations, the second-ranking MFA diplomat is often held immediately responsible for the work of the administrative staff.

In general, Soviets responsible for administrative tasks have limited educational backgrounds, usually speak only Russian and with the exceptions noted below, are seldom seen outside the embassy compound except in groups. They receive even less pay than the diplomatic staff and their living conditions are poor, since they are assigned the least desirable quarters. The class distinctions so evident in the USSR today apply equally in the Soviet colony abroad, as the non-diplomatic staff is looked down on by the diplomats, whose attitudes towards them range from the correct and stiff to the openly hostile. The non-diplomatic personnel often feel discriminated against and are resentful of their second-class treatment. Drunkenness among them, although it is by no means limited to the non-diplomatic staff, is frequent. (Soviet ambassadors, while briefing their staffs prior to receptions for foreigners, have urged them to guard the buffet lest the non-diplomatic staff drink up the liquid refreshments before the guests arrived.)

The personnel of the non-diplomatic staff appear to be even more jealous of petty perquisites and prerogatives than the diplomatic staff. The description given by Aleksandr Kaznacheyev in his book, Inside a Soviet Embassy, of the hostile atmosphere in the Soviet embassy in Rangoon in 1959 is still valid for most other Soviet embassies today. One Soviet diplomat commented that the only difference between the "uncomradely" attitudes of the diplomatic and non-diplomatic staffs was that the former abused one another in "cultured" language while the latter used gutter obscenities.

Non-diplomatic personnel are referred to in Soviet terminology as "technical personnel." The adjective is not meant to denote that these people are technicians, but rather that they do not hold diplomatic rank and are employed in general administrative, logistical work. The administrative section of an embassy can be said to be composed of the categories of employees listed below.

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The embassy physician is often a woman and frequently the wife of a staff official. While it appears that many of the Soviet physicians assigned to diplomatic missions are well-trained, competent medical doctors, reliable reporting shows that a significant number of those who are carried on the official lists as physicians are little more than medical technicians with an average of two years training. In moments of candor, some Soviet diplomats have remarked to their non-Soviet colleagues that they trust the embassy "doctor" to diagnose a common cold and dispense aspirin, but nothing more complicated. In at least one area, the deaths of several members of the Soviet colony have been attributed to the gross incompetence of the embassy doctor, reportedly a graduate physician.

Although treatment of members of the Soviet colony by foreign physicians and dentists is, of course, not encouraged, there is no known regulation which forbids such treatment, which is now quite common. However, the ambassador himself must approve treatment locally prior to a visit to a foreign physician, otherwise the patient will not be reimbursed. Where possible, local physicians who are Communist Party members or sympathizers are chosen for referral. All attempts are made by the embassy to evacuate colony members or TDYers who are gravely ill to the USSR. There are indications that the embassy physician is often an SK agent. In one case the physician was a staff officer of the KGB rezidentura. While it would appear that embassy physicians have little professional contact with their non-Soviet colleagues in the host country, certain among them have accompanied members of the mission staff on visits for treatment to local physicians.

Hospitals have been established and staffed by the USSR in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, some for the purpose of treating the Soviet staffs of the various military, technical and economic aid personnel assigned to certain countries of those areas, and a few for the care of the local population. While under the ultimate administrative control of the Soviet Ministry of Health, these hospitals and their staffs appear to be under the supervision of the office of the Counselor for Economic Affairs, the field representative of the State Committee of Foreign Economic Relations (GKES), which administers all Soviet military, economic and technical aid projects. The staffs of these hospitals do not appear to fall within the administrative

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authority of the Soviet ambassador.

c. The Zavkhoz

This man is the general factotum of every Soviet embassy. He is simultaneously building superintendent, fireman, supply clerk and general maintenance man. He is in charge of all supply procurement, both of materials imported from the Soviet Union and those which are purchased on the local market. He usually has some specific skill such as plumbing or a knowledge of household or industrial electrical installation, and a general knowledge of allied mechanical skills.

Although the zavkhoz of a large Soviet mission is an extremely busy man whose normal duties would seem to leave him little time for intelligence support work, we have received hard evidence that in some installations either the zavkhoz or members of his staff are resident security technicians who perform counter-audio inspections. As in the case of so many other positions in a Soviet mission, it is impossible to draw a composite picture of the zavkhoz or of those members of his staff who perform security support duties. However, some of the known and suspect RIS counter-audio technicians have been known to perform the following tasks:

- To repair and maintain electrical fixtures, including the electrical equipment in the embassy, the office of the Commercial Counselor and the Press and Information Sections of the embassy.
- To obtain estimates on repairs and alterations of the embassy's motion picture equipment.
- To purchase electrical generator equipment for the embassy.
- To maintain the internal telephone system of the embassy.
- To procure supplies for the embassy on the local market.

The cover titles used by known and suspect counter-audio technicians throughout the world has ranged from "employee" and "attache" (the majority), to "engineer," "chauffeur" and "third secretary." Obviously not all of these men have been carried

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on the official lists as either zavkhoz or members of his staff. In general, the zavkhoz seldom speaks anything but Russian, and when dealing with local suppliers works through an interpreter from the embassy staff.

d. The Bookkeeper or Accountant

The bookkeeper of a Soviet embassy, who often serves also as general finance officer, is usually a woman who has been posted from Moscow, i.e., she is not usually the dependent wife of an embassy staffer hired ad hoc. The bookkeeper is fully cognizant of all the myriad rules and regulations set out by the Finance Division of the MFA, including those governing travel and per diem payments. The bookkeeper is in regular contact with the ambassador, both for the purpose of examining running accounts and for preparing the annual budget. In many cases the bookkeeper is a highly unpopular figure, largely because she carefully checks every staff expenditure to the last kopek, and often challenges and refuses to reimburse sums already obligated or spent. Unless the bookkeeper is also a member of the KGB or GRU rezidenturas (Mrs. Petrov's cover job in Canberra was that of embassy bookkeeper and personal secretary to the ambassador), she has no knowledge of RIS operational accountings. The bookkeeper usually speaks only Russian and is seldom seen outside the embassy, unless in the company of other Soviets.

e. The Dezhurniy Komendant

Variously translated as "doorman," "guard," "receptionist," and "porter" (in the sense of concierge), this term is used to describe those non-diplomatic personnel who serve principally as receptionists in virtually all Soviet diplomatic installations abroad. Whereas formerly most of them appear to have been quite low-level types with very limited educational backgrounds, many of the dezhurniye komendanty to be seen today are graduates of one or another Soviet higher institution of learning and have at least a working knowledge of the local language, or of one of the principal languages of the area. We are of the opinion that the latter type is now to be observed much more often than the former. Those who constitute the new group of dezhurniye komendanty are young — usually in their late 20s or very early 30s — and are almost always married.

Usually seated just inside the main entrance of the embassy or other diplomatic establishment, the dezhurniy komendant

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interviews all foreign callers, noting their names and the purpose of their visit. On the basis of what he learns from the visitor, the dezhurniy komendant then summons the appropriate embassy officer on the internal telephone system, or takes whatever action he deems necessary. Since those dezhurniye komendanty of the younger group usually have at least a fair knowledge of the local language, they are often used to interpret for embassy officers and members of the non-diplomatic staff in dealings with local officials and businessmen, and especially in small installations may also serve as telephone operators.

In addition to those duties which bring him into contact with foreigners, the dezhurniy komendant has the following tasks which are concerned only with Soviet personnel:

- Maintains a log book in which the movements of all personnel are recorded. By regulation, all embassy staff personnel who live outside the embassy compound are required to sign in on entering the premises in the morning, and to sign out, giving their destinations and the estimated length of time they will be absent, whenever they leave the premises during working hours. In theory, the dezhurniy komendant must be able to tell the ambassador or other senior diplomatic personnel where all members of the staff are at any given time. During the absence of a given staff member, the dezhurniy komendant makes note of all messages and telephone calls received for a given individual during the latter's absence, and gives them to him on his return.
- Maintains a schedule of assignments for the mission's chauffeurs and serves as vehicle dispatcher.
- Prepares a detailed report on all events at the end of his shift. (Wherever there are sufficient personnel, three shifts of dezhurniye komendanty are maintained.)

Although not every dezhurniy komendant is a staff intelligence officer, there is a sufficient body of evidence to indicate that the position is used by the RIS to place certain junior officers abroad, and many who first come abroad as dezhurniye komendanty have proved later in their careers to be active intelligence officers. Some well-placed sources have stated that all dezhurniye komendanty are KGB officers.

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Although in theory the MFA is responsible for the physical security of a diplomatic establishment, which includes guarding against penetration by hostile foreign elements, in fact the KGB rezident bears full responsibility; therefore, ultimate control of the work of the dezhurniy komendant rests with the KGB rezident, or more directly with his SK man. The dezhurniy komendant carries a service passport and therefore does not enjoy diplomatic immunity.

f. Chauffeurs

Aside from the ambassador's chauffeur (see The Ambassador's Personal Staff), who is not a member of either rezidentura, the chauffeurs assigned to a Soviet diplomatic mission are often RIS employees or SK agents. Identification of these men as RIS support personnel is often made difficult, however, by the fact that they frequently chauffeur MFA diplomats pursuing their regular jobs, and RIS officers in the course of their overt functions. When serving in his RIS role, the chauffeur of either rezidentura drives case officers to agent meetings, provides countersurveillance during agent meetings, and so forth. In recent years there have been few if any documented cases where chauffeurs have served as agent handlers. For more data related to chauffeurs, see section on Vehicles (C-6).

g. Char Force

See The Position of Women in the Mission.

h. Code Clerks

See The Referentura.

i. Spetskuriery

The term spetskurier, an abbreviation of the term kurier spets-okhrany ("courier of the special guard") is used to designate the referentura guards. The best available information shows that these men are employed exclusively as guards within the referentura. Employees of the Tenth Department of the MFA, they are seldom seen outside the embassy compound or buildings, and are believed to have no duties other than maintaining the physical security of the referentura and the other personnel assigned to work therein, although it is possible that some of them may have code and cipher training.

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Information on this category of personnel is very sparse, and we have been able to identify few if any of them in recent years.

C. ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

1. Working Hours and Daily Routine

Soviet embassies normally conform to the working hours of the host-country foreign office, but all Soviet employees are expected to work from approximately 0900 to 1800 hours, with an hour for lunch. All employees are obliged to work five-and-one-half days a week. The ambassador and/or staff members may return to after-hours work as their duties demand, but only non-diplomatic employees are paid for overtime work or for work on holidays. Payments for overtime are usually made in the field but are credited to the employee's account in Moscow. All personnel on the diplomatic list serve, in rotation, as duty diplomat after working hours and on holidays. Normally, embassy employees do not work on Saturday afternoons, although this time is often occupied with Party meetings or other events, as noted elsewhere. The Soviet holidays of 7 November and 1 May are set aside for receiving foreign guests and for holding internal celebrations.

Cipher clerks and other referentura personnel are on 24-hour call, while other employees are assigned night guard duty in other parts of the mission premises on a rotating schedule. Work in the evening hours is very evident during the final preparation of the Annual Report during January and February, and the embassy staff usually works in the evenings when couriers have arrived and just prior to their departure.

2. Length of Duty Tours

The tours of diplomatic personnel vary considerably in length, although the normal tour of duty in Europe, the Western Hemisphere and other temperate climates appears to be three years, and in other areas, two years. Two consecutive tours at one post, with a home leave period at approximately the end of each 12-month period, is the general rule for MFA diplomats, while the number of tours permitted RIS personnel apparently varies according to the needs of their parent organizations and their own individual case loads.

The normal tour of duty of non-diplomatic personnel is two

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years, during which they are not granted home leave. At the end of their tour non-diplomatic personnel return to Moscow and seldom return to the same post.

There is apparently no set limit on the time an ambassador may spend at the same post.

3. Leave Practices

a. Home Leave

Ordinarily, Soviet diplomatic personnel are granted one month's home leave every year with travel at government expense.

Home leave time is further extended to more than 30 days per year if diplomatic posts are in southern zones or in areas deemed unhealthy for Soviets. For instance, employees in Nepal are reportedly granted 40 days home leave each year. In 1965, a Soviet diplomat assigned to Laos said he received two months home leave each year because Laos was an "unhealthy post." He said the same leave practice held in Hanoi.

All leave must be taken in the USSR; there are no exceptions to this rule. The leave period is exclusive of travel time; therefore, if excessive travel is occasioned from a distant post, the diplomat may be on leave for two months or longer.

Although the most sought-after vacation period is summer, a schedule of leave is established in each embassy and Commercial Mission usually toward the end of the calendar year. Thus while a certain first secretary may be permitted to take leave during the summer months in one year, he will probably be obliged to go on vacation during winter in the following year. It appears that the vacation period is a source of considerable competition and discord. Usually the diplomatic wives precede their husbands to Moscow and often return later than their husbands to the foreign post. This gives the wives a longer period to be with their children who attend school in the Soviet Union.

Although the majority of MFA diplomats abroad take leave each year, a heavy work load or some unusual circumstance may prevent an officer from taking any leave during a particular tour. In such cases, the wife usually takes leave whether her husband does or not. Leave may be accumulated, either to be used upon reassignment to MFA headquarters or the diplomat may be paid

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for his accumulated leave time when he returns to Moscow for rotation.

b. Extended Leave

In addition to recreational leave, diplomats on occasion may be detailed in Moscow for consultative purposes or training courses (RIS or MFA) at the beginning or end of a vacation, and records reveal that some diplomats may be away from their posts for as long as several months.

c. Emergency Leave

Leave to return to the USSR is granted those personnel suffering from illness which requires prolonged or intensive treatment, as well as to those who have suffered the loss of a member of their immediate family in the USSR. However, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to determine if the illness or death is indeed true, as these reasons have often been used to cover TDY trips of RIS officers to the USSR, and to cover the recall of personnel from abroad for disciplinary reasons.

d. Unusual Leave Patterns

Sudden departure of Soviet diplomats reported as "on leave" from a foreign post is a strong indication that the person is an RIS officer under diplomatic cover who has been recalled to Moscow for specific instructions or briefings. Ambassadors, however, are often noted as being "on leave" in Moscow prior to special meetings of Soviet government and/or Party bodies.

4. Finance

a. Budget

The budget of a Soviet embassy is drawn up for the calendar year, January through December. It is submitted to the Finance Division of the MFA by mid-January and is usually approved one month later. Accordingly, an embassy must plan to have sufficient reserves from the previous year's budget to cover running expenses until headquarters approval of the current yearly budget is received in mid-February. Unless previously obligated, no funds may be spent after the 15th of December until the budget for the succeeding year is approved.

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The preparation of the annual budget is of special concern to the ambassador, who examines every item in minute detail and spends many hours discussing each allocation with the embassy finance officer. The budget must conform to rigidly established categories for food, fuel, lighting, representational entertainment and overall maintenance. Every planned expenditure for even a small, miscellaneous housekeeping item is weighed and its need evaluated as if the ambassador were to be called upon to defend it in the highest Moscow court. Moscow insists repeatedly that costs be cut and kept at a minimum and that a signed receipt for every disbursement be sent to the Finance Division of the MFA. The only flexibility in regard to the budget is a transferral at the end of the year (with the ambassador's permission) of surplus funds from one category to another in which funds are short. No emergency fund allocations appear to exist. Visiting Soviet tourists or delegates attending international meetings in the local area have been known to get short shrift if they run out of money and appeal to the Soviet embassy for emergency funding.

b. Secret Funds

Not included in the embassy budget are secret funds received by the ambassador in the pouch to be transmitted to the KGB or GRU rezident upon request. Through their own channels the RIS alerts the rezidents that such funds are being dispatched, and the rezidents sign receipts for this money when they receive it from the ambassador

c. Salaries and Allowances

Through the offices of the State Bank, MFA in Moscow deposits funds to cover embassy budgets and salaries with local banks in the form of bank drafts. Salaries are normally paid in cash in the local currency on the 15th and 30th of each month. On occasion, however, in a newly-established embassy where the communications service has not yet become routine, sufficient funds to meet regular salary payments may be delayed and the entire staff, from the ambassador on down, may not be paid for two or three consecutive weeks. Although Soviet officials grumble about this they do not complain officially to their headquarters. Such laxness on the part of officialdom is more or less accepted as the usual way of Soviet life.

Current pay scales and allowances are not known. We do know, however, that all pay and allowance scales abroad are determined prior to the opening of an embassy and salaries are

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not raised to compensate for a rising cost of living until such cost of living increase has reached a point above 10 percent of the base established by Moscow. From what is currently known, however, salaries paid abroad to Soviet embassy employees are extremely low. A diplomat in a West European embassy noted that a typist in the American embassy was paid more than the Soviet ambassador, and a Soviet ambassador in another part of the world commented that in his previous post, he received one quarter of what the Bulgarian ambassador was paid. The salary of a certain Soviet first secretary abroad is not more than \$150.00 per month. Base salaries are augmented by 10 percent for the first year of service in the MFA and by five percent for each succeeding two-year period. Supplements of 10 percent to 20 percent are granted for the maintenance of proficiency in foreign languages. From the salary accredited in Moscow, however, taxes and government bonds are reportedly deducted.

It should be noted that MFA employees do not receive their entire salary while stationed abroad. An employee, accompanied by his wife, receives approximately one-half to two-thirds of his salary locally; the remainder is deposited to the employee's account in Moscow. It may be drawn upon by relatives upon the written authorization of the employee. When an employee is abroad without his wife, he may receive at his post as little as 25 percent of his total salary.

The higher salaries received abroad by Satellite diplomats are cause for complaint by the Soviets, as well as the fact that Satellite diplomats have rent-free apartments and their household effects are sent abroad at no expense to themselves. The Soviets, who depend on smaller salaries, must meet these expenses. To reduce expenses, Soviet diplomats rarely take household furnishings abroad, preferring to pay a small furniture rental fee, plus regular rent for furnished units provided by the embassy, located either within the compound or in apartments.

5. Housing

The allotment of living quarters, whether they be the cramped one- or two-room accommodations common to Soviet embassy compounds or separate apartments located outside the compound, is the prerogative of the Soviet ambassador or of a senior MFA diplomat appointed by the ambassador. Wherever possible, the maximum number of personnel is crowded into a single small

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small apartment house or villa-type building, one family to a room or possibly two rooms, but rarely more than that number. The chief of the referentura and the code clerks are obliged to live in the embassy building, and normally occupy quarters near the referentura itself.

Separate apartments, located outside the embassy or Commercial Mission compound and much more luxurious and spacious than the quarters situated in the compound or Soviet-controlled villa, are usually allotted only to senior MFA diplomats and RIS officers, whose overt and covert duties require them to meet and occasionally entertain foreigners. Although such living accommodations are a cut above the quarters which are occupied by most of the mission staff, in few instances are they above the standard enjoyed by the average young female American embassy clerk-typist.

An apartment occupied by an RIS officer may or may not be taken by his replacement. Analysis of Soviet housing practices in certain areas of the world indicates that, although over a period of several years a certain apartment will be occupied by a succession of ranking Soviet officials — counselors of embassy, military attaches, first secretaries — there is often no covert or overt common denominator among them. Thus, an apartment formerly occupied by Military Attache "X," a GRU officer, may be taken over by Counselor "Y," an MFA diplomat, and in turn later occupied by First Secretary "Z," a KGB officer. On the other hand, certain apartments on the local market, i.e., outside the embassy compound, are known to have been occupied by two KGB or two GRU officers in succession, but rarely more than two. Local real estate conditions permitting, it appears to be Soviet practice not to continue to rent the same apartment for more than a few years, probably for security reasons. The assignment of quarters, both within the embassy compound and outside it, is the cause of a great amount of dissatisfaction and jealousy among the mission staff, each family vying for the best possible accommodations.

6. Vehicles

Privately-owned automobiles remain a great luxury in the USSR. This, coupled with the fact that a Soviet citizen desiring to take his car abroad during a PCS assignment must pay for the transportation of it, plus insurance costs and other attendant expenses out of his own pocket, assures almost without exception that every vehicle driven by Soviets abroad is

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State property, whether or not it is registered in the name of an individual Soviet.

The question of who in a Soviet mission, aside from the clearly identified chauffeurs, is permitted to drive a vehicle cannot be determined with anything approaching absolute accuracy. For instance, an MFA regulation states that any Soviet citizen assigned to an embassy or Commercial Mission may, with the express permission of the ambassador, use an official Soviet vehicle for personal reasons. The same regulation states that the Soviet citizen will be held personally responsible for any damage occurring to the vehicle. It is, however, doubtful that more than a few Soviets abroad are able to exercise their theoretical rights under this regulation.

Up to a very few years ago it was unusual to observe Soviet diplomats with no known or suspect RIS affiliation driving alone, yet this has now become a common sight in many parts of the world. It has been known for many years that both the KGB and GRU rezidenturas have their own vehicles but it remains as difficult as ever under normal circumstances to determine whether a known or suspect RIS officer seen driving is on an operational mission, personal business or pleasure, or occupied with his overt job.

In general terms, it now appears safe to say that any Soviet who has a legitimate need to drive a vehicle in his overt mission capacity is permitted to do so, but that the number of cars available, the frequency of his business needs for a car (and hence his driving experience) and other factors limit the personal use of cars largely to RIS officers and senior representational diplomats.

In many parts of the world officially-assigned Soviets purchase vehicles on the local market, ostensibly for their private use and registered as their personal property. That such a vehicle is in fact State property becomes evident when the original "owner" returns to the USSR and the vehicle is taken over by his replacement; the title, however, remaining in the name of the original "owner." Although it is impossible to make generalizations which are everywhere applicable, in the majority of cases locally-purchased vehicles, almost always of Western manufacture, are used by the RIS rezidenturas while Soviet-made vehicles are utilized chiefly by the MFA staff of the mission for representational or administrative support purposes.

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Soviet-made vehicles are usually serviced and maintained by the embassy motor pool, while non-Soviet-made vehicles are serviced in local garages, usually at those which charge the least money.

7. Registry, Pouch and Cable Procedures

All official but unclassified correspondence between the Soviet mission and the foreign office and other ministries, private industries and individuals of the host country is registered by the ambassador's female secretary, who also maintains copies and a log of such correspondence. The same secretary usually receives overt mail arriving at the mission through the local postal system, and distributes it to the appropriate sections of the mission.

All classified material destined for Moscow which is prepared in a Soviet diplomatic installation outside the Bloc and which is not transmitted by electronic means, and all such material prepared in Moscow for dispatch to official installations abroad, is carried in the diplomatic pouch. Correspondence destined for Moscow (MFA reports, reports of the two legal rezidenturas, MFT reports) is assembled and prepared for transmission in the referentura by an officer or employee of the appropriate mission element; that is, the chief of the referentura assembles and packages all material destined for MFA headquarters, the KGB code clerk assembles and packages material for KGB headquarters, and GRU clerk all material for his headquarters, and the MFT clerk the material for his center. Although RIS pouch procedures are far too complicated to be described in this study, in general terms all correspondence from and to KGB and GRU headquarters is first typed, then photographed, the correspondence itself going forward in the form of undeveloped film strips or rolls in containers specially devised to prevent and detect any opening. A foreign passport of operational value, or an original foreign document of greatest value in its original form will, on the other hand, be forwarded as is. Classified correspondence between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and their field installations, on the other hand, is sent in the clear, only cable traffic being enciphered.

Correspondence prepared by the various elements of a diplomatic mission is handed over, sealed, to the chief of the referentura who then places it in a diplomatic pouch and seals the pouch. In similar fashion, the diplomatic couriers on

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arrival at an installation abroad turn over the pouch to the chief of the referentura, who then unseals it and distributes the contents to the appropriate elements; MFA mail to the ambassador or MFA counselor, KGB mail to the KGB code clerk or rezident, GRU mail to the GRU clerk or rezident, etc. Only the chief of the referentura has the right to open and seal diplomatic pouches.

The travel schedules of Soviet diplomatic couriers are announced to the embassies concerned well in advance, and changes in schedule from one point to the next are signalled by cable, as are the time of departure, means of travel and expected time of arrival of the couriers. The couriers are met on arrival by an escort party, composed of a chauffeur and members of the diplomatic staff of the embassy, which makes certain that the couriers pass through the local customs and immigration authorities as quickly as possible, and then drives the couriers and their pouches to the embassy. A similar escort party drives the couriers and their pouches to the point of departure, and waits until they have left.

Soviet diplomatic couriers always travel in pairs, almost invariably stay in quarters controlled by the Soviet embassy in the host capital, and rarely have any dealings with mission personnel other than the chief of the referentura. Outside the USSR, aside from the chief of the referentura, only the ambassador has any authority over the diplomatic couriers, which is limited to ordering them to remain for a given period of time beyond their scheduled stay, usually because all material for the pouch is not yet ready.

The number of persons authorized to originate cables in a Soviet mission is believed to be very limited, probably only the ambassador, the senior MFA diplomat and the RIS rezidents enjoying this authority. Cables are drafted in longhand on numbered sheets of paper which are kept only in the referentura. Except for the ambassador, who is permitted by regulation to draft cables in his own office, all cables must be written in the referentura, after which they are turned over to the appropriate code clerk for enciphering and transmission.

In those cases where directives and instructions received by cable from MFA headquarters in Moscow must be read by a senior MFA or Party official to a wide number of the mission staff, regulations expressly forbid the cable to be read verbatim and order that the contents instead be paraphrased. KGB and

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GRU residents have been known to brief their ambassadors on the contents of cables from KGB and GRU headquarters, but in all cases they have never read the text verbatim but have rather given the ambassador precis of information.

8. Supplies; Building Maintenance

Because of a chronic shortage of foreign currency, every effort is made to import from the USSR as much as possible of the goods and supplies required to keep the Soviet mission functioning. Technical equipment, telephones for the internal communications system, and like materials are invariably brought in from the Soviet Union. However, furniture, rugs, drapery material and curtains, stationery for official use, building maintenance material such as lumber, plumbing supplies, floor waxes and soaps, and all perishable foods for the embassy mess, are usually bought on the local market, under the supervision of the zavkhoz. Although the zavkhoz is under strict orders from the ambassador to shop about among the local merchants in order to buy at the lowest possible price, it is almost inevitable that over a period of years the Soviet mission falls into the habit of buying most of its supplies from the same merchants.

The maintenance and cleaning of physical facilities in the mission is the responsibility of the zavkhoz and his staff, and these men do in fact make every attempt to keep the physical plant running. However, major, complex repair work is beyond the abilities of most zavkhozy, thus local firms must be called in to repair heating and air conditioning systems, mend roofs and do other jobs which require specialized skills. As in the case of small supplies, the mission usually falls into the habit of calling on the same firms for these specialized jobs.

9. Dependents

a. Working Wives

As in the USSR so abroad, all women are expected to work, whether they be assigned PCS from Moscow to a specific task in an embassy or whether they be the wives of staffers. The wives of those officials with diplomatic rank often work as secretaries in the embassy or Commercial Mission, and on occasion as clerk/typists in the offices of TASS, Novosti or other press correspondents. Those not so employed hold leading positions in the administration of the mestkom (the "Local Committee," the organization of the Trade Unions), where they supervise the

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free-time activities of the colony's children, establish and run the colony's library, and similar activities. In addition, the diplomatic wives are usually active in affairs of the zhensovet (women's council), which organizes free-time activity among the women of the colony, including the organization of choral groups, discussions of common housekeeping problems, sightseeing excursions for the women and children, summer camps for the children, etc. The zhensovet is often headed by the wife of the ambassador.

Except in certain countries of South Asia and the Far East, a regulation forbidding the employment of non-Soviet personnel within an embassy is in force, thus all cleaning of the embassy (and Commercial Mission) premises must be done by women of the colony. In most cases, the char force of an embassy is composed of the wives of the non-diplomatic staff, i.e., of the chauffeurs, code clerks, doormen, clerks. However, wives of diplomatic staff members also work on the char force in some embassies, and have occasionally been surprised on their hands and knees, with pail and scrub brush in hand.

All staff wives who work are paid for their labors. The best evidence available, however, shows that the rate of pay is extremely low, to the point of being minimal. In some embassies women of both the diplomatic and non-diplomatic staffs have been trained to serve as waitresses at receptions, formal dinners and during protocol visits to the embassy by prominent persons of the host country. In other embassies, women act as guards at the outer gates of the walls surrounding embassy premises. In no instance known to us, however, have women served as door-men/receptionists ("dezhurniy komendant"), such posts being held exclusively by men.

The number of women assigned to an embassy as bona fide MFA staff employees or under MFA cover is small compared to the total number of employees, since the number of slots is often limited by the host government, and these utilized to place as many men as possible in positions which carry diplomatic immunity. The fact that staff wives are obliged to work obviates the necessity to send women abroad to do jobs for which those already on the spot are at least partially qualified. The jobs which female staff members regularly hold (whether bona fide or for cover purposes) are: secretary/typist to the ambassador (sometimes referred to as zavkants, or chief of the ambassador's secretariat); bookkeeper or finance clerk; telephone receptionist; schoolteacher; embassy physician; and file clerk/typist.

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Only three or four women employees of the MFA are known to hold diplomatic rank.

b. Position of Women in the Mission

Most women in a Soviet diplomatic mission have little leisure time. If they are not regular staff employees, their services may be called upon for ad hoc duties which, in addition to personal housekeeping tasks, cleaning, laundry and child care, admit of little free time during the day, while evenings are taken up with organized activities. Wives do snatch time to gossip, and violent personal jealousies arise between wives over living quarters, personal possessions and petty perquisites. Cliques develop, and formal complaints are made against a certain wife or unmarried female employee who is judged as becoming too Western in her attitudes and in her manner of dress. Wives have been criticized for purchasing Western luxuries for their children and have been warned about buying children's nylon dresses and chewing gum, and otherwise spoiling the children with decadent Western extravagances.

There are many reports of unfaithfulness among Soviet wives. In one Soviet mission, the ambassador's male secretary was sent home in disgrace because he was having an affair with the wife of the KGB rezident.

The Soviet woman seen abroad in the late 1940s and in the 1950s — overweight, dumpy, without make-up, wearing a flour-sack dress and speaking no foreign languages — is no longer a stereotype. Many of the Soviet wives seen outside the USSR today dress with a certain degree of chic, do not huddle together, dumb, on social occasions, and have a fair understanding of foreign languages. Some, in fact, are easily able to pass for Western Europeans, at least superficially. These women, however, are more often than not the wives of RIS officers and are themselves educated women with a certain degree of exposure to Western customs. Nevertheless, the majority of Soviet wives abroad remain a colorless lot who adhere to regulations, rarely learn the local language, seldom acquire any real understanding of life outside the USSR, and are subservient to their husbands. Many diplomatic wives spend as much time as possible on leave in the Soviet Union, particularly if they have children attending school there.

Wives, like their husbands, complain of boredom resulting from their restricted living conditions within the compound; they

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complain of scrimping "to make do" with a limited budget and they complain of the weather if the embassy is located in a hot-climate country. Soviet women do, however, receive permission to make repeated trips outside the compound to visit the local stores and markets, beauty parlors, and to attend certain approved movies. Although Soviet women have been observed at beaches and parks in some areas accompanied only by their children, they usually travel in pairs while outside the mission and must report any contact of consequence that they may have with any member of the local populace or with any other foreigner. Some Soviet women have been sent home in disgrace for shoplifting. Many Soviet women seem starved for personal possessions; bright scarves, hats, nylon hose, Western shoes, cosmetics and junk jewelry. Soviet diplomatic wives do not frequent local restaurants or cafes.

c. Schooling of Dependent Children

By law, all children of Soviet parents assigned or attached to a Soviet mission abroad must attend Soviet-run schools. The only documented exceptions to this rule have occurred in Northern Europe, where the preschool children of two Soviet diplomats attend locally-run kindergartens; one case in the Far East where the daughter of the Soviet ambassador to Japan attends a non-Soviet elementary school; and several cases in East Africa, where Soviet children of elementary school age attend a non-Soviet school. The exceptions notwithstanding, in recent years no school-age child of Soviet parents is known to have attended a full course of instruction (i.e., all grades of elementary, junior high or high school) in any but a Soviet-run school.

Conditions permitting, each Soviet colony abroad runs a school, or schools, attended by children six through eleven years of age, which is in session from 1 September through 15 May. In some areas, there are only four-year classes. All children 12 years and above must return to the USSR for further education. In those areas of the world where circumstances of climate or lack of proper facilities prohibit the setting up of schools, all children seven years and above are returned to the USSR to be educated.

While the Soviet curriculum varies greatly from that of non-Soviet systems of education and by itself is sufficient reason for the children of Soviet citizens stationed abroad to be educated in the Soviet Union, a consideration of equal importance

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is the overriding importance of "proper" political indoctrination of the young, which the Soviets regard as being done correctly for their citizens only in the USSR. Although the hostage system of the Stalin era has largely disappeared, at least as far as the Soviet citizen posted officially abroad is concerned, nevertheless the fact that one's child or children must remain in the homeland during the greater part of one's service abroad certainly acts as a deterrent to defection in many cases. The separation of parents and children for long periods of time obviously causes feelings of deep anxiety in many of the parents, and a significant number of Soviet diplomatic personnel have complained with apparent sincerity of the hardship which this system brings.

Soviet schools abroad are under the overall supervision of the ambassador or principal officer, but under the direct supervision of the secretary of the mestkom. In many posts, the teachers — all women — are professionals sent from Moscow whose only duty is teaching, while in other posts the teachers are staff wives with professional teaching experience. The curriculum followed in Soviet colony schools is precisely the same as that used in the USSR.

Although the practice does not appear to be widely encouraged, there are known instances of children of the more zealous Communists among Bloc diplomatic personnel attending Soviet colony schools.

The overall supervision of Soviet colony schools abroad is the responsibility of the All-Union Ministry of Education, which operates through the Schools Inspectorate of the MFA.

The children of parents stationed abroad are permitted to visit their parents during vacation time, and it is now no longer rare or even highly unusual to find all members of one family together at a foreign post for a period of two or three months during the summer. The costs of vacation-time travel to and from the USSR must be borne by the child's parents. Each child must be accompanied by a Soviet citizen at all times while traveling.

10. Personnel Practices

a. Soviet Diplomatic Ranks

Until World War II, the Soviet foreign service did

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not assign diplomatic ranks to its officers, but since approximately 1944 it has employed the titles and ranks in common usage throughout the rest of the world, with certain variations as noted below. Soviet diplomatic ranks are as follows, in descending order:

Ambassador

Minister-Counselor

Counselor, First Class

Counselor, Second Class

First Secretary, First Class

First Secretary, Second Class

Second Secretary, First Class

Second Secretary, Second Class

Third Secretary, First Class

Third Secretary, Second Class

Attache

Referent

Probationer

All ranks from attache through ambassador carry diplomatic passports; all persons assigned abroad below the rank of attache carry service passports. Within a consulate-general, the consul-general usually has a diplomatic rank roughly equivalent to that of counselor. In a large embassy where there are several senior officers with the rank of counselor, the senior among them sometimes carries the rank of minister-counselor. Where the title of minister-counselor is not used, the next-ranking officer after the ambassador is named first counselor of embassy. Precisely what differences there are between first- and second-class secretaries is not known, and in fact the titles themselves appear to be used by the Soviets themselves infrequently.

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b. Promotions

The Soviet MFA officer always carries with him the highest rank which he has reached, i.e., if he was a first secretary at Paris during his last tour, he will appear at his next post, Rome, with the same rank or possibly with the rank of counselor, but never with a rank lower than that of first secretary. Under the Soviet system he could not be demoted and expect ever to serve abroad again. RIS officers who go abroad under MFA cover, on the other hand, sometimes change rank downward or carry the same rank, often a relatively low one, from post to post. For example, a KGB officer may first appear in Washington with the rank of second secretary, then in London as third secretary, and later in New Delhi as counselor of embassy. On the other hand, another KGB officer may appear in a variety of posts throughout the world always with the rank of third secretary. (There is one well-known KGB officer who has held the ranks of attache and third secretary from approximately 1948 to the present.) Where it is possible to observe the career of a given Soviet diplomat over a period of years, the fact that he has changed rank erratically or downward is a sure sign that he is an intelligence officer.

Promotion of bona fide MFA officers appears to be slow. Promotion of RIS officers, however, is often rapid, and the fact that a certain Soviet diplomat arrives at a given post as a probationer, and within two tours has risen to the rank of second secretary, is often another indication that he is an intelligence officer. Promotions of RIS personnel under MFA (and MFT) cover are often handled directly by the KGB and GRU, to the point that the ambassador sometimes learns of the "promotion" of one of his subordinates, an intelligence officer under embassy cover, from the resident and not through MFA channels.

c. Trainees and Probationers

In recent years it has become customary for trainees to be sent from Moscow to embassies abroad, for the purpose of improving their language and area knowledge. The average trainee is in his mid-20s and is usually a fifth-year student of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (IIR) who is specializing a certain geographical area. He usually remains at a foreign post for periods ranging from nine months to a year, during which time he is often assigned to the ambassador's personal staff as a general factotum, translating

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articles from the local press, preparing background reports on the local political and economic scene, and so forth. The trainee during this period is not yet an employee of the MFA, although he may well already be a junior RIS officer. He carries a service passport.

The lowest rank in the Soviet diplomatic order is that of "probationer" (stazher), although the probationer does not carry a diplomatic passport and does not enjoy diplomatic immunity. The probationer is usually in his mid- or late 20s and a recent graduate of the IIR. Oftentimes, he has been a trainee in the country of his first regular assignment, and usually has a good basic working knowledge of the local language. The probationer usually spends about two years at his first post during which time he, like the trainee, is assigned to the ambassador's personal staff and does much the same work as the trainee, although the probationer is frequently rotated among the various sections of the embassy: Consular Section, Political Section, etc. During his first tour the probationer's work is observed carefully by the ambassador and other senior officers, and at the end of his tour the ambassador forwards to the MFA an evaluation of performance, with a recommendation to hire the probationer as a career officer, or with a recommendation that he not be given permanent status owing to general unsuitability. If accepted by the MFA, the probationer receives the temporary rank of referent and soon after, the full diplomatic rank of attache. Prior to receiving the rank of attache, however, the probationer must by regulation be granted full membership in the CPSU.

Although we now estimate that at least 50 percent of all graduates of the IIR are taken into intelligence work and are assigned abroad, mostly under MFA cover, by no means do all probationers enter MFA, either for RIS cover purposes or as genuine diplomats; nor are all probationers RIS officers. Determination of a probationer's RIS affiliations can be made only after he has been observed for a considerable period of time during PCS assignments.

11. Observance of Official Holidays

Seven holidays are officially observed in all Soviet missions abroad: 1 January (New Year's Day), 1 May (International Labor Day), and 7 November (anniversary of the October Revolution) are universally celebrated as full holidays and little work is done for periods of several days prior to and after them.

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23 February (Red Army Day) is the occasion of official receptions given by the Office of the Military Attache, and of unofficial receptions limited to members of the GRU rezidentura. 8 March (International Women's Day), 22 April (Lenin's Birthday), and 5 December (Constitution Day) are celebrated by special meetings within the colony but are not necessarily free holidays nor are they usually marked by official closings of Soviet installations. 20 December, the anniversary of the founding of the Cheka, is a KGB holiday. For obvious reasons it is not celebrated publicly abroad, and the extent to which it is celebrated privately by KGB rezidenturas is unknown.

7 November and 1 May, the principal holidays, are celebrated, at least in large missions, in three stages, compressed to one or two in smaller posts. On the first day a formal reception is given at the Soviet embassy, to which ranking officials of the host government, prominent host-country politicians, intellectuals, businessmen and journalists, and the leading diplomats of foreign embassies are invited. Soviets who attend are, in principle, only the diplomats, down through the rank of attache in smaller posts, but limited to the ambassador, counselors and first secretaries in larger ones; however, there are more Soviets of middle rank at this reception than at any other where foreigners attend.

On the second day a reception is usually held to which only diplomatic personnel of the Bloc countries are invited. Whether the Yugoslavs are invited depends on the political climate at the time. The Communist Chinese are not known to have been invited since 1960 - 1961. The atmosphere on the second day is much more relaxed than on the first, and the celebration is marked by entertainment such as choral singing and folk dancing by both the Soviets and personnel of the various Bloc countries. The third stage is a general party held exclusively for all members of the Soviet colony, regardless of rank. All Soviets not obliged to be on duty attend this party, which is celebrated by organized entertainment such as the staging of plays and choral singing and by unorganized consumption of great quantities of food and drink. Alcohol, which is officially restricted to a few bottles during the rest of the year, flows freely during these celebrations, releasing inhibitions and causing old feuds and resentments to flare up. These parties are usually the occasion for at least one major fistfight among members of the staff. The party of 1 January is a full family affair, with attendance practically obligatory. In the afternoon the children

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and some of the grownups do acts and skits, and the party continues into the evening, usually very liquid.

D. SECURITY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

1. General

To understand the Soviet concept of security abroad, it must be emphasized that "peaceful coexistence" notwithstanding, the Soviet citizen abroad, whether he be in a "friendly" Bloc nation or in a non- or anti-Communist country, considers himself to be in hostile territory, surrounded by real or potential enemies. That this fixation did not die at the end of the Stalin era but persists in full vigor today, is evidenced not only by the continued use by the KGB — the security arm of the CPSU — of the term "The Main Enemy" (Glavniy Vrag) to denote the United States and other powerful leading non-Communist nations of the West, but also by the reports of recent knowledgeable defectors and by the unguarded remarks of Soviets in many parts of the world. No matter how relaxed the attitudes of many official Soviets stationed abroad may appear to be in comparison with those of the 1940s and early 1950s, such relaxation must be regarded as only superficial. Every Soviet citizen being posted abroad is imbued with the concept that, once outside the boundaries of the USSR, he is on "enemy territory" (the term is actually used at times) and will be surrounded by "enemies" who attempt constantly to entrap him for the purpose of subverting the Soviet State.

In order to reduce to the lowest possible minimum the danger of physical penetration of Soviet installations and the subversion of Soviet citizens abroad, a wide variety of prophylactic measures is taken in all Soviet missions.

2. Screening and Briefing of Personnel

a. The Exit Commission

Prior to being permitted to leave the USSR, each Soviet citizen is subjected to a lengthy investigation of his personal life and political background (fully documented under Soviet Party practice), which involves inter alia writing his biography and being interviewed by various Party commissions. The culmination of this investigation for the Soviet being posted abroad PCS to a diplomatic mission is his mandatory appearance before the so-called Exit Commission (Kommisiya po Vyyezdam

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Zagranitsu pri TsK — Exit Commission of the CC/CPSU), an organ of the Secretariat of the CC/CPSU. This commission is known to be headed by Aleksandr Semenovitch Panyushkin, former ambassador to the United States, who has a long history of intelligence activity and who is also Chief of the Department of Personnel Abroad of the CC/CPSU.

The Soviet going abroad appears before a so-called "instructor" of the Exit Commission, usually a KGB officer who has served in the area and who is well acquainted with the individual's file, including Party and KGB reports on his personal life and political background. The "instructor" then proceeds to question the interviewee concerning his personal background, his political attitudes and training, and then recommends to the Exit Commission whether he shall be permitted to go abroad. The Exit Commission is the highest authority in the USSR concerning permission to go abroad. In theory, there can be no appeal from a negative decision.

Once the Exit Commission has granted permission for a Soviet citizen to go abroad, the latter is given a lengthy list of regulations concerning such matters as his duty to protect Soviet State secrets, to defend the interests of the Soviet State in all possible ways, to avoid entanglement with foreign women, etc. Having read this, the prospective traveler signs a document stating that he has read and understood all parts of the list.

b. Briefing on Arrival at a New Post

At his post abroad, the newly-arrived officer is briefed individually and in private by a member of the KGB rezidentura (who does not, however, identify himself as such) on local security hazards, which briefing usually includes a general description of the activities of the local counterintelligence service against the Soviet mission, the attitude of the local population towards Soviet citizens in general, and actual or alleged past means of "provocation" (entrapment) used in the host country against members of the mission. On the occasion of a serious security flap, such as the arrest of a Soviet agent in the host country (always described by the Soviets as a "provocation" against them), the ambassador will often call a general meeting of the entire staff, refer to the "provocation," warn all present to be especially vigilant against further "provocations," and remind them all that, before leaving Moscow, they signed an agreement to protect Soviet interests by all possible

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means. RIS staff personnel and co-optees are briefed concerning the organization, modus operandi and personnel of hostile intelligence and security services operating in the host country.

3. Personnel Security and Discipline at the Post

a. General

The conduct of Soviet citizens serving abroad, both in its professional and private aspects, is viewed by the Soviet system from two sides — the Party and the KGB. In the first instance, the Party is responsible for guarding the "moral" conduct of its members, which does not mean conventional morality in the Western sense, but rather embraces all aspects of the individual Soviet's life within the context of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. In the second instance, the KGB rezidentura is responsible for preventing all Soviet citizens in the host country from being subverted by hostile, anti-Soviet elements.

It is sometimes difficult to determine at which point the personal conduct of a given Soviet abroad passes from the concern of the Party to that of the KGB. The following example may partly clarify this point: Second Secretary "X," an MFA diplomat, begins to drink heavily, usually after duty hours but also on two occasions during work-days. However, he has maintained complete sobriety outside the embassy and when dealing with foreigners. The case is brought to the attention of the ambassador who, working with the Party secretary, makes certain that the matter is raised at the next Party meeting and that Second Secretary "X" is chastized in a formal "criticism session." No further action will be taken, assuming that the secretary reduces his excessive drinking to the accepted norm, and the matter is handled entirely within the framework of Party discipline. However, should Second Secretary "X" have been drunk repeatedly in public outside the embassy, in a place or places where the host-country counterintelligence service had been able to observe him, the matter would become a security case and would be handled exclusively by the KGB rezidentura, which would take the position that the secretary had laid himself open to compromise.

In order to lessen the possibility that they will fall under the influence of "bourgeois decadence" (the term is still very much in use among the Soviets), non-diplomatic staffers are seldom permitted to remain at one post longer than a single tour.

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MFA diplomats and RIS staffers under MFA cover often remain for two tours. However, there is considerable evidence showing that the KGB becomes very concerned over the security of an MFA diplomat who remains at the same post for over two tours. Presumably, the KGB has less concern for the possible attraction of hostile influences to their own staff, many of whom remain in the same geographical areas, if not the same country, for much longer periods of time.

b. The Regime of the SK

The "protection" of all Soviets stationed abroad from subversion and recruitment by hostile intelligence services is the responsibility of the Soviet Colony (SK — Sovetskaya Koloniya) Section of the Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) of the KGB. (The term "Soviet Colony" includes all Soviet citizens, whether diplomats, administrative staff, trade personnel, correspondents and others who are assigned to a mission abroad.) Within a KGB legal rezidentura, at least one staff officer is assigned to SK work and he in turn recruits agents among the other Soviet personnel, for the purpose of observing and reporting on the conduct of their colleagues. The number of KGB officers assigned to SK work in a mission is apparently small — perhaps one officer for about 50 people, and in small installations one officer for the whole colony. But the ratio of SK agents to the number of staff personnel is quite high, on the order of one to five. Thus, in a typical installation each SK agent would be assigned the task of observing his or her close colleagues, with perhaps specific assignments to watch one or more people in his close periphery whose actions were judged by the SK to merit special attention. In an embassy, the staff of which numbers 100, including wives, there are likely to be about two SK officers and 20 SK agents. Although a KGB regulation exists which forbids the recruitment of foreigners as SK agents, it is known that this regulation is sometimes relaxed in certain cases where certain foreigners of proven pro-Soviet loyalty are in especially good positions to report on Soviet citizens in their milieu.

In theory, outside the KGB rezidentura, the identity of the SK officer(s) is known only to the ambassador, and the SK agents are kept carefully compartmented from one another and are known only to the SK officer and the rezident. However, the identity of the SK officer is frequently known within the colony, because of the fact that his constant investigations and

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snooping soon reveal his true status. In some instances the SK officer is also the deputy KGB rezident.

c. Crimes and Misdemeanors

Minor derelictions, serious offenses and crimes against Party morality are punished by a variety of measures, in strict accordance with the Statute of the CPSU, which sets out in great detail the duties and responsibilities of the Party member. These punishments range in intensity from public reproach within the Party organization, usually done at a Party meeting, through several steps to a severe reprimand which is registered in the offender's Party file, and culminate in expulsion from the Party. The last step means in effect that the individual, unless later "rehabilitated," has lost any possibility of holding any position of significance in Soviet public life. Depending on the nature of the offense or crime, the sentence of expulsion from the Party may be accompanied by a sentence of imprisonment under civil law. Those punishments meted by the Party organization which are not sufficiently grave to be recorded in the Party member's personal Party dossier are not cited thereafter in any Party document, except in the case of KGB officers, where they are recorded in the officer's Party dossier. On the other hand, Party punishments sufficiently grave to warrant recording in the member's Party dossier remain on record until his death.

Derelictions, violations and crimes which are punishable under either the formal code of the CPSU or under the informal rules of the SK section of the local KGB rezidentura are many. Among those which are known to have been committed frequently by Soviets stationed abroad during the last decade are: drunkenness, adultery with the wives of other Soviet citizens, currency speculation, misuse of position for the purpose of embezzling State property, misappropriation of State property and funds, unauthorized contact with foreigners (particularly Americans and British), and shoplifting. A high official of the Foreign Cadres Department of the Secretariat of the CC/CPSU noted several years ago that Soviet diplomats have been recalled to the USSR for the following offenses: habitually getting drunk with local citizens in cafes and restaurants; driving while intoxicated and being arrested by the local police; remaining all night in local restaurants and bars; habitual drunkenness during working hours; unauthorized contact with Americans; while driving, becoming involved in traffic accidents and killing or injuring local citizens.

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The foregoing examples notwithstanding, there appears to be no universal, fixed attitude on the part of Soviet authorities abroad toward the various derelictions and offenses punishable under the provisions of the pertinent Party and KGB rules and regulations. The influence of the individual ambassador, and the Soviet view of the politics and counterintelligence activity of the particular country, affect the severity with which standard rules are applied. The following incidents demonstrate this:

- In a Western European country, several officers of a Soviet embassy — among them at least one KGB officer — regularly frequented prostitutes in the open red-light district of one of the large cities of the host capital. There were no operational implications in these visits.
- During a previous tour in the same country a suspect KGB officer stationed in Scandinavia fathered an illegitimate child during a liaison with a local woman. He was not punished, although his offense became known to his superiors.
- A Soviet ambassador in the Western Hemisphere misappropriated State property for his own use. He was subsequently reduced to the rank of candidate member of the Party but was later "rehabilitated" and is now serving again outside the Bloc as ambassador.
- A KGB co-optee in the Far East had intimate relations with a large number of local women, a fact which was well known.
- A Soviet ambassador in Western Europe appeared drunk in public on several occasions, and on one of these occasions insulted the local head of state and the entire diplomatic corps. He is currently serving abroad in another European country, still as ambassador.

These examples, however, must be viewed as exceptions rather than as the rule, for it is clear that where the Soviet citizen abroad exposes himself to the local public view in such a manner as to embarrass the Soviet State; or where he or where his actions come to the attention of host intelligence and security authorities, in situations which the KGB regards as compromising from the security viewpoint, he will normally be recalled to the USSR

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as quickly as possible. Some 190 Soviets were recalled for cause from foreign posts in the year 1959 alone.

d. Contact with Foreigners

Contact with and cultivation of foreigners is officially encouraged by the MFA for some specific advantage, such as promoting friendliness to the USSR or gaining some service or favor, and normally only in the context of specific directives which levy requirements to promote a certain propaganda line, or to gather certain specific information. Such contacts are encouraged for diplomats only and not for second category employees, for whom, in general, they are forbidden. The KGB and GRU, of course, use such contacts for operational assessment, development and other purposes. It can normally be assumed that a Soviet diplomat who regularly entertains foreigners in restaurants or at his apartment, or who visits local night clubs or bars alone or with another Soviet, is an intelligence officer or co-optee. Other RIS or non-RIS cultivation of foreigners for purely social purposes is discouraged, if not strictly forbidden, as is the frequenting of bars, night clubs and other places of "dubious social nature."

In addition to the ever-present fear of being observed and reported on by the SK network in the colony, the MFA diplomat does not cultivate foreigners or visit local places of entertainment — except for motion picture theaters — for the very simple reason that he cannot afford to do so.

Except for the zavkhoz and his assistants, who occasionally must deal with local merchants in their places of business, and the chauffeurs, the non-diplomatic staff are seen infrequently outside the official buildings or compound, and then usually only in groups. The code clerks are forbidden to leave the mission premises alone. In some areas it is known that non-diplomatic, non-RIS employees are expressly forbidden to consort with local citizens unless accompanied by another Soviet, and this rule may in fact apply in most or all Soviet installations abroad. In fact, special warnings have been issued from time to time concerning contact with Americans and the dangers of AIS efforts to compromise and recruit Soviets. In periods of crisis or political sensitivity, such as publication of incidents involving RIS activity, times of delicate negotiations, or major Soviet political events such as Party Congresses, all contacts with foreigners may be cut off and other seemingly drastic security precautions taken.

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All members of the staff of a Soviet diplomatic mission are required to sign a log book which is maintained by the duty officer, or dezhurniy komendant, noting the destination and purpose of any trip outside the embassy, time of departure and expected time of return. Should a given staff member not return within a certain period of time after his expected time of return, the KGB rezidentura is informed and a search for him is begun.

All contacts with foreigners, whether made in line of duty or resulting from chance encounters, must be reported to a superior official. A high-ranking MFA diplomat or important Party official abroad may go out socially with foreigners at will, although he is expected to report his plans in advance and afterwards to his superiors. A lower-ranking diplomat or member of the non-diplomatic staff who associates with foreigners without an official purpose may come to the attention of the SK officer if the relationship continues for more than a couple of meetings. If the relationship goes on and is not reported by the subject, the SK man will normally attempt to determine the nature of the relationship, sometimes via his SK agents. If the SK officer finds that the relationship may be indiscreet or compromising, or suspects any hint of disloyalty or indiscipline in it, he notifies the KGB rezident who in turn notifies KGB headquarters. The suspect is normally packed off to Moscow under the most convenient pretext. The suspect is investigated further and questioned by the KGB only after he has returned to the USSR, and not on the spot, in order to prevent possible defection in the host country.

Even KGB officers, if they maintain unauthorized contact with foreigners which they do not report, may be in serious trouble and may well be returned to Moscow. SK officers are forbidden to investigate other KGB personnel, however; the investigation of such a case is the responsibility of the KGB rezident only. He in turn must receive permission from KGB headquarters to allow some of his subordinates to surveil the suspect.

If it is discovered by the SK section that a GRU officer or employee is in unreported contact with a foreigner, the chief of the SK section or the KGB rezident notifies the GRU rezident, who then informs GRU headquarters. However, if the SK section has absolute proof that the GRU officer or employee is in unauthorized contact with American, British or other hostile intelligence services, the SK officer exercises his power to

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arrest the guilty party, and then notifies KGB headquarters and — if he trusts him — the GRU rezident.

4. Physical Security

a. Defense Against Entry

In addition to making maximum use of human resources, the Soviet system of physical security abroad also makes use of a variety of sophisticated technical and electronic means to guard its installations against penetration by hostile elements. Wherever possible, Soviet installations abroad are housed within a compound, or are otherwise surrounded by high walls or fences. Means of access to the compound or mission area are severely limited, there usually being only one or two gates or other means of entry, all others having been walled in or closed off. During normal business hours, these gates or entry ways are guarded constantly, and locked at the close of business. In certain parts of the world, the grounds within the fence or compound walls are often patrolled at regular intervals by guards, often accompanied by vicious dogs. In the mission buildings themselves, all outside doors and windows (save those in the staff living quarters) are locked at night, and a duty guard system is employed during the hours of darkness.

With the exception of cleaning women and other menial laborers in certain parts of Asia and the Far East, practically no foreigners are employed on a regular basis in a Soviet embassy, and nowhere do any foreigners have access to classified or sensitive areas. In some areas of the world, however, the same house-painting, roofing, glazing and similar repair and maintenance firms have been retained for years by Soviet embassies. Outside the embassy, foreigners are often employed by TASS, Novosti and other organs as translators, secretaries and clerks. In almost all cases such foreigners are members or sympathizers of the local Communist Party, spotted and vetted by the Party or individual trusted Party members, and even they do not work in areas where they have access to classified information.

b. Internal Communications in a Soviet Embassy

Physical circumstances permitting, all Soviet diplomatic installations abroad are equipped with an internal telephone system which connects the principal offices within the installation. This system is always of Soviet manufacture, consisting of a number of telephone instruments which are connected in the standard fashion to one another by wires which

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run through a switchboard. The telephones are dial-type cradle instruments, of standard Soviet type and are not equipped with any known anti-audio devices. The switchboards in general use are either manned or automatic, depending on local requirements, i.e., on the number of instruments necessary. The system is usually sent from Moscow via the diplomatic pouch and is installed by a team from Moscow. In every installation so equipped, a member of the non-diplomatic staff is responsible for maintenance and repair of the system, sometimes a trained technician of the KGB or GRU rezidenturas.

The internal telephone system is not connected to any telephone line running outside the installation. Users of the internal system are forbidden to discuss any classified information, and while this rule is obviously violated from time to time, the system is seldom used for the discussion of sensitive matters. The internal telephone system of one large Soviet embassy in the West has well over 100 individual numbers, including the referentura, the office of the ambassador, the duty diplomat, the duty guard, the building superintendent and the quarters of the staff members who live in the embassy building.

Although the Soviet diplomatic installation is normally connected to the local telephone system by a few lines, only the larger embassies have many. These lines are connected directly or indirectly, through a manned switchboard, to a few internal offices, such as that of the ambassador, the Consular Section, the Political Section and the Protocol Section. In some embassies, incoming calls are taken by the doorman/receptionist on the one telephone in the building near the main entrance of the building. He summons the Soviet officer being called to the outside telephone via the internal system. It is believed that all Soviet citizens are warned prior to going abroad to non-Bloc countries that host-country telephone systems are tapped by the host-counterintelligence organs, and it is known that all Soviets stationed abroad assume this to be the case. (Indeed, Soviet intelligence sometimes uses lines to misinform local counterintelligence authorities.) However, this assumption does not stop many Soviets from gossiping on the telephone, and in the early stages of social relationships of Soviet officials the phone is sometimes used inevitably.

c. Technical Security

All classified information and material in a Soviet mission is maintained under guard in a secure area, and some

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Soviet diplomatic installations are equipped with areas which are alleged to be audio-proof (see D 4 d). In addition to those measures, other steps are taken routinely to ensure that a high degree of physical security is maintained by technical means.

Each official installation and all living quarters are swept by an audio-tech team at least once a year, either by the resident audio technician(s) or by a team from Moscow.

Many Soviet embassies are equipped with electronic warning systems which signal the entry of unauthorized persons, and all referenturas are equipped with alarm systems which are used to warn the chief of the referentura or the referentura guards that a police or other hostile raid is threatened or is taking place.

Radios are kept on not only in sensitive areas such as the ambassador's office and the referentura, but in many other areas where routine work is done. No civilian-type radio receivers not of Soviet manufacture, nor civilian-type radio receivers of Soviet manufacture which have been repaired on the local market may be used in sensitive areas of the installation.

In those missions not yet equipped with audio-proof areas, sensitive discussions are often held out-of-doors, where the possibility of interception is virtually nil.

d. Secure Areas

(1) The Referentura

The referentura, or secret section of a Soviet diplomatic installation, houses all classified materials of the MFA, MFT, KGB and GRU components, including the code and cipher gear of all four; and provides a secure working area for all embassy, Commercial Mission and other authorized personnel. It is headed by a chief, often a middle-aged man, who holds diplomatic rank ranging from attache (most often) up to first secretary. He is an employee of the Tenth Department of the MFA, which is responsible for the Soviet diplomatic courier system and for the cryptographic section of the MFA, both in the USSR and abroad. (Whether the Tenth Department of the MFA is an integral part of the KGB, or whether it is an integral part of the MFA over which the KGB exercises security control is not known. However, up to a few years ago the Tenth Department was headed by a

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lieutenant general of the KGB, and even if the chief of the referentura, the MFA code clerks and the diplomatic couriers are MFA employees, all of them hold high KGB clearance. Referentura chiefs, MFA and MFT code clerks, and regular diplomatic couriers apparently do not engage in operational work involving agents.)

Where conditions permit, i.e., where the embassy occupies a multi-story building, the referentura is located in an area between the lower and upper stories in order to lessen ease of outside access from ground or roof level.

Depending on the size of the MFA staff and of the intelligence rezidenturas which it services, the referentura is composed of several rooms: one or more reading rooms, equipped with desks at which one can read files and write reports; the office of the chief of the referentura; the work areas of the MFA, KGB, GRU and Commercial Mission (MFT) code clerks; and an area which houses the transmitter(s). Where there are no transmitters, it houses radio receivers and recorders which may be used to receive blind broadcasts from Moscow, or for use in radio intercept operations. The work areas of the MFA, MFT, KGB and GRU code clerks are separated from one another and at least in theory none has access to the other's area. The referentura also often contains an incinerator for the destruction of classified waste. What follows is a composite description of the physical layout of the referentura of a Soviet embassy; the referentura in any given area may be different, but only in minor detail.

There is only one entry to a referentura; all other doors, interior windows and other openings having been walled in. To enter the referentura, one must pass through two doors, an outer one of wood or other light material and an inner one of solid steel. The outer door, which appears superficially to be an ordinary one, is equipped with a lock which can be opened only by electrical impulse from within the referentura. To get inside the first door, one pushes a concealed button located high up on or near the door frame, which activates a buzzer within the referentura. The duty officer or guard inside, in turn, pushes a button which, by means of electrical impulse, releases the lock and simultaneously causes a light bulb set above or on one side of the door to flash intermittently, indicating that the outer door is unlocked.

After opening the outer door one steps into a short corridor at the end of which is a massive steel door set in a heavy

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metal frame. In the center of this door is a thick, round piece of glass (probably optical glass) about the size of a quarter, permitting the referentura duty officer or guard to see clearly the person who wishes to enter. The referentura staff holds a list of all personnel cleared for entry, whether they be embassy or Commercial Mission staffers, press representatives, UN organization officials or members of visiting delegations. Permission to enter the referentura must be approved in Moscow. It has been reliably reported that only the KGB can grant such approval.

Once inside, the visitor states his business to the chief of the referentura or to the duty guard. Assuming that the visitor wishes to read a classified directive or to write a report, he is given a desk in the reading/writing room, which is located just inside the steel door. (This last sentence applies only to MFA and other non-RIS officers; the RIS personnel always have their own separate work areas.) If he wishes to write a report, the visitor so informs the referentura chief or the referentura duty guard, and is then given a certain amount of paper on which the visitor prepares his draft, in longhand. Each sheet of paper is numbered, and all sheets must be accounted for to the referentura personnel when the visitor leaves.

The chief of the referentura then summons a cleared female typist to the referentura. After the material has been typed in final form, the referentura chief submits the report to the appropriate embassy officer for approval. If the latter orders certain changes, the author is requested to return to the referentura to make the suggested changes; otherwise the report is forwarded to Moscow. (The foregoing refers only to reports prepared by MFA officers and by RIS officers working in their cover capacities. The preparation of RIS reports is done in a completely different manner.)

It appears, on the basis of imperfect evidence, that only the principal embassy officers, i.e., ambassador or charge d'affaires and counselors, may draft and send cables to the MFA.

As noted above, classified reports are prepared by the originating officer in longhand, and typed by a female secretary. With the exception of the ambassador, diplomatic officers do not have personal secretaries, thus whatever typing must be done is assigned to a pool in some embassies, while in other embassies one secretary is assigned to each major component, e.g., Political Section, Cultural Section, Consular Section. In the latter

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case, it is the secretary assigned to a specific section who goes to the referentura to type the reports prepared by officers of that section.

Regulations regarding the security of the referentura are strict. No documents may be taken outside the referentura without permission of the ambassador; no notes may be made from documents on file therein and taken outside; no reports of a classified nature may be worked on outside but must be completed in toto within the referentura; discussion of classified subjects among diplomatic staffers working in the referentura is forbidden, etc. Several well-placed sources have reported, however, that these regulations are often violated; that reports are partially written in non-secure areas of the embassy and taken to the referentura for completion; that precis are made and notes taken from documents on file in the referentura and left in desk drawers in non-secure areas; and that discussions of classified material often take place among diplomatic staffers working in the referentura. One KGB co-optee who was working with top secret KGB agent reports kept them for a period of several days in an unlocked drawer of his desk, which was located far from the referentura.

Violations of the type cited above occur principally because of working conditions prevailing in many referenturas: crowded working space, no ventilation, foul, overheated air being among the chief complaints. Embassy officers often accumulate material for several reports in their own work areas and only then go to the referentura and complete them all at one time, in order to avoid having to make frequent visits there. One source suggested that the Soviet habit of over-classifying reports leads to security violations, noting that many officers do not regard these classifications seriously. He cited as a typical example the frequent instance of classifying "secret" a report in Russian which is a verbatim translation of a completely overt article in the host country press.

Alone among the diplomatic staff, the ambassador prepares his reports in his own office, his working materials being brought to him by the chief of the referentura, who also returns them when the ambassador has finished his work or leaves his office for any significant period of time.

In addition to a certain amount of background material on the host country, CPSU and MFA directives, the records of the local Party organization are retained in the referentura. The

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embassy bookkeeper and the finance clerk also keep their records and funds there during non-duty hours. It appears that very little, if any, non-RIS classified material is retained longer than six months, at the end of which period it is destroyed. RIS components retain almost no files. We know of no area in a Soviet diplomatic installation outside the referentura which is considered to be secure. Few safes or vaults are known to be located outside the referentura and any material which is kept legally in them, or in cabinets or desks, is not regarded as sensitive. However, the KGB rezident keeps some technical gear in his cover office, which is locked when he is not there.

Within the referentura, no one is allowed past the area which houses the reading/writing room(s) except the chief of the referentura, the code clerks and certain officers and audio technicians of the rezidentura staffs. All windows in the referentura are equipped with steel bars and heavy steel shutters, which are kept closed and locked. Communications between the referentura and the rest of the embassy is maintained by telephone(s), tied in to the internal telephone system. It is forbidden to have within the referentura any telephone instruments connected to the outside local system. Radios usually play constantly in the referentura in order to drown out any conversations taking place, and probably also to relieve the boredom of routine for the code clerks.

Having completed his work, the officer notifies the chief of the referentura or the duty guard and turns over to him whatever material is necessary. The officer who is familiar with the system of entry and exit is able to leave the premises without assistance; otherwise he rings a buzzer which summons the duty guard, who then opens the heavy inner door. This is done in some embassies by first pressing a button and then operating a double-handled lever which releases the lock. When the inner door is opened, a sustained buzzing sound is heard, which continues until the door is shut again. If an attempt is made to open the door improperly an alarm sounds, different in intensity from the buzzer, and one of the referentura personnel immediately appears to investigate the cause.

(2) Other Secure Areas

Certain areas within Soviet diplomatic installations have recently been reconstructed in such a manner as to make them "audio-proof," to provide a place where highly classified matters can be discussed without fear of being intercepted by any known audio device. This involves building a new floor,

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ceiling and walls within a given area, placing them about eight centimeters from the original surfaces, lining the space between with some (unknown) substance and fitting an electronic device (no details). All outside windows in such areas have been fitted with double panes of opaque glass, also fitted with the same electronic device which is placed between the wall, ceiling and floor surfaces.

(3) Other KGB and GRU Work Areas

In addition to the "safe" areas cited above, in certain embassies the KGB and GRU rezidenturas maintain their own individual work areas, in which are kept various types of operational equipment such as audio gear, cameras and photographic supplies, and dark rooms. These areas are sometimes located adjacent to the referentura, or in other instances in areas of the embassy premises which afford maximum physical security, e.g., cellars with thick walls. Entrance to these areas is restricted to staff members and co-optees of the rezidentura which controls the area. One KGB co-optee, whose status was not widely known among the embassy staff, was instructed never to approach the KGB area if other Soviets who were non-KGB personnel were in the vicinity and could observe him. In at least one instance, it has been reliably reported that such areas have been equipped with counter-audio devices, an assumption which can be safely made for all such areas.

e. Regulations on Classified Talk

The virtually inherent sense of security in almost all Soviet officials is complemented and reinforced by formal laws and local ground rules concerning the protection of State secrets and other sensitive information. In addition to signing a statement swearing that he will protect the Soviet State by all possible means, the Soviet citizen abroad is liable to heavy punishment, including the death penalty, for disclosing State and military secrets. Thus, although Soviet wives (and their husbands) often gossip on the telephone and in their quarters about their colleagues, Soviets abroad are generally observed to avoid, even in their homes, talk of sensitive matters or revelation of their intelligence status or activities.

The Soviet abroad assumes that his public telephone is tapped by the local counterintelligence service, and many of them probably assume that the local KGB rezidentura has the same capability.

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Regarding the internal telephone system in the embassy, it has been reliably reported that the SK section taps the internal lines periodically, in order to determine whether classified or sensitive information is being discussed. Sensitive information is sometimes discussed within Soviet embassies outside of the "safe" areas therein.

E. REPORTING FROM A SOVIET EMBASSY

1. Types of Reports

There are seven specific types of reports which are prepared by every Soviet diplomatic mission throughout the world:

- The Annual Country Report (Godovoy otchet posol'stva)
- The Political Letter (Politicheskoe pismo)
- The Monthly Chronicle (Khronika sobitii)
- The Essay Report (Spravka)
- The Country Guide Book (Spravochnik)
- The Report of Conversation with a Foreigner (Zapis besedy)
- The Quarterly and Semi-Annual Reports
- a. The Annual Country Report (commonly referred to as "The Annual Report")

The most authoritative report prepared by the MFA staff abroad, this document is a detailed summary of information for the previous 12-month period. All overt sections of the mission contribute to its preparation, which is begun in December; the report itself is due at MFA headquarters in Moscow in mid- or late February of the following year. Unlike certain other reports cited here, the Annual Report goes forward over the signature of the ambassador only.

The Annual Report is divided into the following sections (content described below is optimum; shortcomings in this and other reports will be noted at the end):

- The Internal Political Situation of the Host Country
Contains a complete account and analysis of all

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changes in the governmental structure. Contains a complete account and analysis of political activities, trends and policies of all political parties, trade unions and other organizations of political significance. It is prepared by the Political Section of the embassy.

- The Foreign Policy of the Host Country

Contains accounts and analyses of the host country's foreign policy towards countries other than the USSR, and is divided into two distinct sections: relations with the Socialist Bloc countries, and relations with the capitalist nations. This section is also prepared by the Political Section.

- USSR/Host Country Relations

Embracing the entire scope of relations between the USSR and the host country during the past year, this section includes accounts of the number and type of delegations from either side, negotiations on both sides, the number and content of diplomatic notes passed by both sides; and comments and analyses of all these events. This section in fact describes the totality of the Soviet effort in the host country. Contributions to it are made by the various sections of the embassy and by the Commercial Mission, the Soviet press representatives and representatives of other Soviet organs (excepting the RIS rezidenturas per se) in the host country.

- The Economic Situation

Contains accounts and analyses of aspects of the economic life of the host country, including the economic policies of the government, economic trends and foreign trade. This section is prepared jointly by the Commercial Mission and the Political Section of the embassy.

- The Military Section

Contains a general description and analysis of the state of preparedness of the host-country's armed forces, and comments on such political/military

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matters as the relationship of the host country with NATO, SEATO and other military alliances. Where applicable, this section also contains analyses of the attitudes of the host-country government and political parties towards such subjects as the Multi-Lateral Force and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It does not, however, include strategic intelligence information nor information describing technical details of certain armaments possessed by the host country, this information being restricted to GRU channels. The section is prepared by the military attache's group alone in its overt capacity.

- Cultural Relations

Depending on the state of cultural relations between the host country and the USSR, this subject is either treated as a separate section or is included in the USSR/Host Country Relations section. When treated as a separate section, it contains an account of the number and composition of Soviet cultural groups, including sports teams, which have visited the host country; an account of host-country cultural groups and delegations which have visited the USSR; and analyses of the effect which these occasions have had on relations with the USSR.

- The Administrative or Organizational Section

Covering mission and Soviet colony life, this section includes sub-sections on such matters as Party work, Komsomol and trade union activities; the language training program; housing and other logistics problems; and financial questions. It is believed that this section is prepared by the Consular Section with the direct participation of the ambassador and the first counselor.

- Proposals

The final and most important section of the Annual Report, this consists of a short summary of the conclusions drawn in the foregoing sections, which is followed by a point-by-point listing of proposals and suggestions for changes and improvements in Soviet foreign policy with regard to the host country. This

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section is prepared by the ambassador personally, in consultation with certain of the leading officers of the mission staff.

b. The Political Letter

This is an ad hoc report containing details of an extraordinary event such as a military or political coup, special elections and announcements of major governmental policy changes. Forwarded over the signature of the ambassador alone, it contains a report on the event, analysis thereof, and proposals for Soviet action. Although it may in theory be prepared by the ambassador alone, the Political Letter is more often the combined work of the ambassador and the various chiefs of the mission.

c. The Monthly Chronicle

This is a short summary of occurrences in host-country domestic and foreign affairs, as reflected in the host-country press. Prepared usually by a probationer or attache, it is forwarded over that officer's signature at the end of each month.

d. The Essay Report (Spravka)

This report deals with a specific topic in the realm of host-country internal or external politics; for example, the anti-Vietnam protest movement in the United States. These reports are written by the junior members of the embassy diplomatic staff — probationers, attaches and third secretaries — and may be initiated by the officer himself but more usually are prepared by order of the ambassador or a section head. Each probationer is expected to write an Essay Report each two or three months, and attaches and third secretaries less often, albeit regularly. In preparing the report, the writer first discusses the subject matter and general outline with the ambassador or chief of section, to whom the draft must be shown prior to being approved for forwarding to Moscow. When finished, the report is forwarded over the signature of the preparing officer.

e. The Country Guide Book

In theory, this document is a cross between a post report and an almanac, and contains detailed background information on all aspects of the host country. However, such a report is to be found in few Soviet diplomatic establishments,

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general background knowledge of the host country being one of the outstanding weaknesses of the MFA abroad.

f. The Report of Conversation With a Foreigner

By MFA regulation, every conversation with a foreigner conducted under formal conditions, i.e., in the course of official business, must be made a matter of record and forwarded to Moscow. These reports are described as containing the foreigner's name and position, the circumstances under which the meeting took place, and the subjects discussed. It is quite obvious that not all conversations are in fact recorded (see A 2, The Overt Work of a Soviet Diplomatic Mission Abroad), and that those reports which are made are often found unsatisfactory by Moscow. One certain explanation of this is the fact that the RIS officer under diplomatic cover, being obliged to prepare a memorandum of conversation with a foreigner in his overt capacity, will prepare a very sketchy report for the MFA, and a very detailed, comprehensive report on the same subject for his rezidentura.

g. The Quarterly and Semi-Annual Reports

These are short reports designed to bring up to date the information contained in the Annual Report. They are believed to be prepared by the diplomatic staff of the embassy, without the participation of other mission elements.

2. Routing of Correspondence to Moscow

Each document forwarded by a Soviet diplomatic establishment to Moscow is accompanied by a covering note or dispatch ("soprovoditel'noe pismo," lit., "accompanying letter"), which contains a brief statement of the contents of the document and a list of the various organizations and officials to whom copies should be routed. This determination is made by the ambassador. Routine documents are sent to the appropriate geographical area desk and to the Archives Division of the MFA, while more important ones are sent to the CC/CPSU and to the deputy foreign minister responsible for the geographical area in which the embassy is located. The covering dispatch is written and signed by the reporting officer and countersigned by the ambassador.

3. Classification of MFA Documents

Three categories of security classification are used in

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the MFA: Top Secret, Secret, and For Official Use Only. The various types of reports described above are classified as follows:

<u>Top Secret</u>	<u>Secret</u>	<u>For Official Use Only</u>
The Political Letter	The Annual Report	The Monthly Chronicle
	Quarterly Reports	The Country Guide Book
	Semi-Annual Reports	
	The Essay Report	
	Report of Conversation With a Foreigner	

Depending on the sensitivity of content, The Essay Report and the Report of Conversation With a Foreigner may be classified either "Secret" or "For Official Use Only," the determination being made by the ambassador.

4. Examples of Materials Carried in Soviet Diplomatic Pouches

Listed hereunder are the subject titles of all materials contained in a diplomatic pouch sent from a certain Soviet embassy to the MFA; and in a pouch from the MFA to the same embassy. The pouches in question were dispatched in the early 1960s and were carried by regular Soviet diplomatic couriers. Examination of the contents showed that all the material related entirely to "straight" MFA work and that no material originating in KGB or GRU rezidenturas or headquarters was contained in either pouch. While the contents of these pouches may not necessarily be typical of all diplomatic pouches, this material is included here to aid understanding of the sort of material which is sent by MFA elements to and from the field.

a. List of Items Sent by Pouch to MFA Headquarters From a Soviet Embassy

- Requests for certain literature; two films; questionnaire forms for consular use (current supply depleted); certain information on a foreign matter (not defined); status reports on certain visa requests.

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- Acknowledgment of receipts for literature and curricula for the embassy school.
- Finance: Report on medical expenses and funds allotted for a certain person; acknowledgment of receipt of money for embassy use; transmittal of membership dues to the Ministry of Agriculture.
- Information Reports: Report from the embassy school; journals and bulletins of various countries; embassy information bulletin; document on an international organization; translation of an article from the local press entitled, "Yugoslavia is Looking for Contacts"; letter giving the composition of a host-country shipbuilding delegation; references to policies on disarmament; additional data on a certain personality, as requested.
- Reports of Conversation: Report of a conversation between the Czech ambassador and an embassy officer; report of a conversation between a member of the host-country Friendship Society and an embassy officer; report of a conversation with the chief editor of a student newspaper in the host country.
- Letter for Khrushchev written by the chief editor of a student newspaper in the host country.
- b. List of Items from MFA Headquarters Sent in a Pouch to a Soviet Embassy
 - Job Descriptions: Summaries of job descriptions — abstracts.
 - Foreign policy materials: Compendium on foreign policy; report on negotiations for halting nuclear weapons tests.
 - List of materials available for embassy use: Text of sound track for Soviet films; catalogues of available films and slide projections.
 - Materials relative to embassy schools for children: Curriculum and studies for elementary grades; program for testing and evaluating schools; copy of a resolution from conference of school employees.

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- Announcements of personnel changes: Announcement of _____'s appointment to chief of an MFA geographical division; note concerning the transfer of a certain person.
- Financial matters: Statement on the opening of credits in a local bank; authorization for expenditure of money for an undefined project; request for an expedite accounting of an amount of money deposited in the bank by a certain person; rules for transferring money within socialist countries.
- Couriers: Announcement of arrival and departure dates of diplomatic couriers.
- Permissions granted for certain embassy actions; letter from the Finance Department of the Ministry of Agriculture indicating Soviet acceptance of an invitation to participate in tests and experiments with the host country.
- Refusal of embassy request: Negative reply to a request for Soviet participation in a congress for irrigation and drainage.
- Confirmation of reports received by headquarters: Receipt of a program on an international congress of interest to the Ministry of Health.
- Requests for reports on current elections in the host country; expedite answer to questions concerning a parliamentary deputy of the host country.
- Informational material: Summary from the Ministry of Agricultural Products, Lithuanian SSR; copy of an MFA note concerning a reception for host-country diplomats.
- Visas: List of names for whom visas were granted or refused.
- Consular matter: Copy of a letter relative to a certain person on a consular matter.
- Reports on conversations: Memorandum of a conversation between a certain person and the counselor of

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the Polish embassy; memorandum of a conversation between a certain local person and the charge.

5. Weaknesses and Shortcomings in MFA Reporting From a Soviet Diplomatic Mission

Samples of reports from Soviet embassies to MFA headquarters show that the reporting done by Soviet diplomats in the economic and political fields — which subjects comprise the bulk of "straight," i.e., non-RIS reporting — is pedestrian at best, at worst misleading, and unobjective throughout. As noted in other parts of this study, the sources of information of the overwhelming majority of Soviet diplomatic reports are the local press and, to a much lesser extent, local citizens. Thus, the bulk of this information is not only overt but also in many cases untrue or only partially true, given the fact that the press in many areas of the world is controlled by one or another political party or special-interest group, and that some of the Soviets' "live" sources deliberately give them false or misleading information either because of a pro- or anti-Communist slant, or give them information which these people think the Soviets wish to hear. It is true that most diplomats without affiliation to the intelligence services of their governments rely for information on the same types of overt sources as the MFA diplomats. The non-Soviet career diplomat, however, usually has an understanding of the country in which he is stationed — its political system, history, cultural traditions, customs — far beyond the comprehension of the average MFA diplomat, and often of his RIS colleagues, and is thus usually better equipped than his Soviet counterpart to evaluate accurately what he reads and hears, and to report it objectively.

There is often little background material on the host country in a Soviet embassy. In one mission in Western Europe, the only reference works available were an old almanac published in the United States and a French encyclopedia. In yet another embassy, save for the previous year's Annual Report, there were no background reports older than six months, all other material having been destroyed or forwarded to MFA headquarters. Some embassies do retain Essay Reports and similar material for as long as two years, but no Soviet embassy is known to be equipped with a reference library of the sort which is found in every American embassy installation abroad.

The Annual Report, the most authoritative document written by the Soviet embassy, is a curious mixture of fact and rubbish.

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Not only does it contain information which is not true, but also the information which is accurate is analyzed strictly according to the dictates of Marx and Lenin. One source who participated in the writing of two Annual Reports commented that the finished reports were most unobjective, presented all facts in black and white, twisted some facts to make them acceptable to one or another tenet of Marxism/Leninism, greatly overestimated certain events in the political life of the country and failed to understand the importance of others. The same source noted that it is usually the older members of the staff who set the tone of the Annual Report, and since these men are rigid Party bureaucrats, the report itself is rigid, uninspired and unimaginative. Some examples of Annual Reports: In a Soviet embassy in Europe, the Economic Section of the Annual Report contained a statement that the average wage in the host country was lower than that of two of the most poverty-ridden nations of Europe; in fact, the average wage in the host country is among the highest in the world. While preparing the Political Section of an Annual Report in yet another embassy, the staff debated the significance of the fact that an industrial group had supported workers' demands for higher wages. After considerable heated discussion, an analysis in consonance with the teachings of Marx and Lenin was found; the industrialists had supported the workers' demands in order to control them through the trick of giving them higher wages.

That the Party leaders and certain of the MFA chiefs realize that reporting from most Soviet embassies is poor is shown by some of the comments quoted in A-3. Kaznacheyev, in his book Inside a Soviet Embassy, commented on the low quality of reporting, and noted that the staff was criticized for it. Nonetheless, and in spite of remedial measures taken, the reporting done by the staff of most Soviet embassies is often as poor today as it was in Rangoon in 1959.

If, as described above, MFA reporting from the field is often of such low quality, how is this possible when it must be prepared by RIS officers who comprise approximately three-quarters of the diplomatic staffs of most Soviet embassies? The answer is anything but simple, but we believe that it can be found in the following reasons. First, most of the reports prepared for dispatch to the MFA are meant for background information only, and are read chiefly by the lower echelons of the MFA geographical area divisions, and thus play no role in the formation of Soviet foreign policy. Only the Political Letter and similar reports, which relate to significant changes in the host country,

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are sent directly to the Collegium of the MFA and to the CC/CPSU. Such reports are believed to be prepared jointly by the ambassador and the KGB rezident (perhaps also the GRU rezident), and thus contain information from overt, semi-overt and clandestine sources, plus analyses done by the most qualified men in a Soviet embassy. Secondly, few officers of either rezidentura participate significantly in the preparation of much of the reporting which is forwarded through MFA channels, and in those instances where they do participate, they attempt to persuade their MFA colleagues to report accurately, usually to no avail. Last, but most important, the responsibility for the collection of detailed, objective political intelligence within the Soviet system rests in the final analysis with the KGB, which obtains it by clandestine means and reports it exclusively through KGB channels.

F. THE PARTY ORGANIZATION IN A SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MISSION

1. General Considerations

All members of a Soviet diplomatic mission (including the Commercial Mission), both diplomatic and non-diplomatic, and the majority of their wives, are members of the CPSU or of the Komsomol. In order to maintain the patent fiction that Soviet citizens serving abroad are officials and employees of the government without significant connections with the Party, each Party and Komsomol member must surrender his Party card prior to leaving the USSR for assignment abroad. In return, the Party member receives a card identifying him as a member of the trade union (profesionalnyi soyuz, usually shortened to profsoyuz) of his parent ministry; this card being known as a profsoyuznyi bilet. The Komsomol member receives a card identifying him as a member of "The Physical Culture Organization."

In like fashion, the Party organization or unit abroad is never referred to by its true name, but rather as "The Trade Union" ("Profsoyuz"), and Party meetings are referred to by the euphemism "Trade Union meetings." The Party secretary is usually known as proforg, or Trade Union organizer.

In those Soviet diplomatic missions where the Commercial Mission is large, both the embassy and the Commercial Mission have their separate Party units, the most active members of which form yet a third Party organization known as the Party Bureau or Party Committee, headed by a secretary who is "elected" by all members of the unit. In fact, candidates for the position

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of Party secretary are proposed by the ambassador, in consultation with local Party activists, to the CC/CPSU, which must approve the nomination, and only then are put up for election by the local unit. The election results are a foregone conclusion.

Although the Party secretary normally acts under the control of the ambassador, under certain circumstances the secretary enjoys a certain amount of independent authority. For instance, the secretary appears to have the authority to establish, contrary to the desires of the ambassador, a local commission of investigation to make inquiry concerning charges of dishonesty against a Party member involving embassy funds or property. Further, the Party secretary has the authority to act on the findings of such a commission, even though the ambassador may not agree with them.

To show, respectively, how the CC/CPSU believes Party work in a diplomatic mission should be organized, how it actually is organized and how Party meetings are conducted, four examples are presented here.

- An official of the Central Committee of the CPSU said that the principal task of the Party Bureau (i.e., the Party unit composed of leading activists from the Commercial Mission unit and from the embassy unit) is to provide overall orientation and guidance to the subordinate units of the Party organization. Thus the secretary of the Party Bureau must be a skilled organizer who will not only know how to provide such orientation and guidance, but will also supervise the practical work of the subordinate units. The work of the subordinate units, in turn, must be directed to the immediate tasks which are peculiar to them (commercial and diplomatic), within the framework of the orientation and guidance given them by the Party Bureau. The secretaries of the subordinate Party units must bring to fruition the policies of the CC/CPSU, fulfill the assignments given them and maintain strict discipline, both in the political sphere and in the sphere of personal conduct. It must be impressed on all Party members that the fulfillment of these tasks is not the responsibility of the secretary alone, but of all Party members. The acts of individuals which disrupt the harmony of the collective must not be allowed to pass unnoticed by the Party organizations, but must be discussed openly in

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Party meetings and appropriate action taken.

This CC/CPSU official further said that the principal tasks of the Party Bureau and its subordinate units are: to carry on educational work toward the fulfillment of the decisions of the latest Party Congress; and to fulfill all tasks assigned by the CC/CPSU through the ambassador. The CC/CPSU must receive all work plans and the minutes of meetings of the Party Bureau and subordinate Party units.

- The following information is taken from actual reports of two separate Party meetings; one, a meeting of a subordinate Party organization and the other a Party Bureau meeting.

The first meeting opened with an announcement of the agenda: presentation by the secretary of a report on the work of the organization for a three-month period; a critique of the report and of the Party work during that period; and a discussion of work plans for the next three-month period. There followed a review of responsibilities: Comrade "X" (a second secretary), the secretary responsible for organizational matters; Comrade "Y" (a consular officer), the deputy secretary responsible for educational work; Comrade "Z" (an attache) responsible for production matters; Comrade "A" (a counselor) responsible for mass-cultural work. It was then announced that the main effort of the organization was directed toward assuring that the productive (i.e., diplomatic) work of the mission was carried out in the best possible manner. Note was made that, despite the hostility of "ruling circles" in the host country, and despite "provocations" on the part of host-country counter-intelligence against the mission staff (KGB agents had been apprehended), the mission had fulfilled all the orders of the Soviet government.

In the jargon so dear to the Party hack, the secretary announced that "all comrades, regardless of post or rank, treated their responsibilities honorably, and with sincerity and seriousness fulfilled their tasks." Among the tasks cited were: discussing how to increase contact between the embassy staff and the local populace; the condition of the colony's library; preparation of lectures on the international situation; the preparation

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of lectures on the builders of Communism, on morale, on the strengthening of socialist law; the condition of the colony's school and the upbringing of children; together with the mestkom, to organize "evenings of relaxation" for all personnel and their families.

Criticism of Party work took the form of pointing out that deadlines for completion of discussions ordered by the CC/CPSU had not been met, and that insufficient preparation had been made for studying materials promulgated during the latest Party Congress. The meeting ended with a tirade from one of the more zealous members, who noted that some of the embassy staff were not subscribing to Pravda, nor any other Soviet newspaper. The zealot observed that those who did not read the Soviet press could not possibly be well-informed and could not in fact even consider themselves to be Soviet citizens.

- A meeting of the Party Bureau of a certain diplomatic establishment was held for the purpose of preparing a work plan for the next six-month period. (Work plans for Party Bureaus abroad, following the pattern established in the USSR, are drawn up for three- and six-month periods. In general, the difference between the two types appears to be that the first involves specific topics of immediate concern while the second concerns broad, overall subjects.) Following a general discussion of pertinent CC/CPSU directives and how they could be implemented, a plan of work was drawn up consisting of the following specific tasks:

To prepare plans for mass-cultural work among the colony in general, and among the embassy women, in particular;

to prepare and execute plans for political and cultural work among Soviet seamen calling at host-country ports;

to study the work of Inturist in the host country, and to make recommendations for improving it;

to increase the vigilance of the colony in the host country, with particular attention to possible provocations (a favorite Soviet euphemism for all manner of illegal acts committed by Soviet citizens

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abroad, from espionage through shoplifting and traffic violations) by the host-country authorities against both the kollektiv and individuals;

to study and report on specific measures to extend the circle of contacts of the embassy in political, public and business circles in the host country ("public" is a broad term encompassing press and journalistic, cultural and intellectual circles);

to study what had been accomplished by the Commercial Mission in the improvement of host-country/USSR trade; and

to study means by which the decisions of the 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU could best be implemented.

After the members of the Party Bureau had agreed on the six-month work plan, certain members present were each assigned the job of preparing papers on one of the above subjects, and were assigned deadlines. Those not assigned these specific tasks were given overall responsibility for blocs of several of those topics.

Although certain of the members present suggested that, owing to the complexity of the subject matter, two or three members should be assigned to one subject, arguing that if one member alone were to prepare a report which would then be discussed by the Bureau as a whole (such was the secretary's order), only the person who prepared a specific report would be knowledgeable on the subject while the other members would be discussing from ignorance or half-knowledge. The suggestion was dismissed out of hand by the secretary.

Prior to this meeting, the chief of mission and the first counselor discussed certain shortcomings in the work of the diplomatic mission, and decided between themselves that these shortcomings should be brought to the attention of the other members; they decided that the best way to accomplish this would be via the "criticism session." It was then agreed that the chief of mission would criticize the counselor for dereliction of duty in the matter to be brought to the attention of the others. The counselor would then admit his guilt. After the counselor

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had admitted his guilt, the chief of mission would then praise the counselor for the excellence of his work in the field for which he was primarily responsible. At that point the counselor was to make a few mild criticisms of the chief of mission but then praise him for the excellence of his overall performance.

In the diplomatic mission where the meeting cited above took place, the Presidium of the Party Bureau (secretary, deputy, chairman) met weekly to discuss the most pressing Party problems, while the Party Bureau as a whole met once a month.

- An extraordinary Party meeting was held in another diplomatic mission to discuss a breakdown of discipline among the staff. As it was a Party Bureau meeting, all the leading officers of the various sections of both the embassy and Commercial Mission were present, including the principal officers of both the KGB and GRU rezidenturas. The meeting was held over the strenuous objections of the Bureau secretary, a KGB officer, who apparently saw in the meeting a threat to his authority as a Party official; the secretary agreed to hold it only after a clear majority of the members threatened to unseat him. The meeting began in an atmosphere of open hostility, to which was added the element of confusion, no one knowing quite how to go about starting the discussion. What followed for the next several hours was a series of charges and counter-charges concerning real or imagined insults to most of the staff; heated criticism and self-criticism; and finally "comradely" agreement that the meeting had been beneficial and provided the basis for study aimed at a general improvement of all Party work in the mission. The results were as follows:

All members of both the embassy and Commercial Mission staffs are obliged to obey the orders of the chief of mission, who is the leading representative of the USSR abroad; this includes even those persons not under MFA direction. However, to be completely effective as chief of mission, the principal officer must exercise the authority which he holds, establish and maintain discipline; oversee and supervise the work of those under him, both those with diplomatic rank and the administrative staff; and see to the morale and well-

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being of the entire staff. Although it was generally agreed that the chief of mission should be obeyed by all, some members present noted that his orders to them ran counter to the orders received "from their own headquarters," and that the chief of mission had failed to take this into account.

Proper respect to the position and authority of the chief of mission was not being paid by the leading members of the embassy staff, and this was reflected throughout the mission. It had reached the point where no one recognized another as his administrative superior, no one would obey orders and no one was working as he should. Members of the non-diplomatic staff openly defied the orders of the diplomatic staff and cursed their superiors even in the presence of foreigners. Rudeness was prevalent everywhere and mutual insults were exchanged with great frequency. Cliques were being formed everywhere, each vying for position and all ignoring the presence of constituted authority.

The Party life of the mission was badly organized and poorly conducted. More than half of the total Party membership of the mission was engaged in supervising the work of the rest, who were expected to do all the work. The study of Marxism/Leninism was being conducted in a vacuum, without reference to the daily needs of the collective, and the general level of Party-educational work had fallen into an unsatisfactory state. Because of the selfish and "uncomradely" attitudes of the diplomatic staff, the recreational and other vital needs of the non-diplomatic staff were being neglected and a hostile attitude towards the diplomatic staff engendered. A further result of the breakdown in discipline was that both the living and working areas of the embassy had become very dirty.

Disciplinary action against certain members of the staff, resulting in their immediate recall to the USSR, was insufficiently explained to the rest of the staff. Confusion and low morale were the results, since many of the staff did not know the true cause

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of recall and thus feared that it was due to arbitrary actions on the part of the mission's leadership.

Charges of abuse of public funds were levied. Comrade "X" was accused of outfitting his quarters with furniture from embassy funds, while the pressing needs of other members of the staff were neglected.

The meeting finally ended with a short speech by one of the activists, to the effect that the proceedings had been most beneficial and that the points made would provide the basis for fruitful study.

2. The Role of the Party in a Soviet Mission

The role of the Party appears to be a vital one in the life of a Soviet diplomatic mission. Through the local Party organizations the CC/CPSU controls the political life of the embassy and its subordinate units, and guards against any possible deviations on the part of individuals. Whatever the ideological convictions of the Soviet diplomat (or KGB or GRU officer) may be today, he knows that he must at least give full apparent loyalty to the concepts of Marxism/Leninism, and understands fully that his every political statement is being carefully monitored at every Party meeting. Moreover, whether Party activities are specifically designed for this purpose, the fact remains that the Party member abroad is kept so busy at tasks levied on him by the secretary and other Party officials — aside from his professional duties — that he has little time to think of or contemplate the alien life which goes on about him outside the embassy walls.

The Party member is also fully aware that the Party meeting can be used to denigrate him and perhaps ruin his career, should he deviate from whatever standards have been established as the norm. Thus, some personal dereliction, although completely lacking in political meaning to the Party member guilty of it, can be interpreted by his enemies during a meeting as "uncomradely" or "against the best interests of the collective." Since the minutes of all Party meetings must, by regulation, be forwarded to the CC/CPSU in Moscow, it is obvious that too many reports of "uncomradely conduct" would harm the career of the offender.

However, it appears that verbatim transcripts of meetings

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such as the extraordinary session described above are not forwarded, but rather a precis is written in such a manner as to hide the damaging evidence (after all, all present would be tarred with the same brush). In fact, a ranking Party official of the embassy in question visited the offices of the CC/CPSU not long after this meeting and assured a ranking official of the Central Committee that "a very harmonious collective" existed in the mission.

Although it is impossible to draw a composite picture of a Party meeting in every Soviet diplomatic installation throughout the world, more often than not it is an occasion for releasing pent-up emotions and venting the spleen accumulated by living elbow-to-elbow, often in substandard conditions, rather than an opportunity to study and discuss the loftier meaning of the writings of Marx and Lenin. In this sense the Party meeting may have a stabilizing effect on the mental health of the Soviet diplomatic colony, although personal dignity is abused and personal feelings injured.

While the ambassador ostensibly plays no special role in the Party life of a Soviet diplomatic mission, in fact he and the Party secretary often decide on the agenda prior to meetings, and in general decide what subjects will be emphasized. As the representative of the CC/CPSU the ambassador is, of course, charged with overall responsibility for Party affairs in all the units under him.

The KGB rezidentura is not known to play any special role in the internal Party affairs of a Soviet mission abroad. Unless elected to special office by other Party members, officers of either rezidentura appear to have no more influence in the conduct of Party matters than do bona fide MFA and MFT officials and non-diplomatic staffers. The professional intelligence work of the rezidenturas is not discussed or even mentioned at Party meetings.

3. The Mestkom

The word mestkom, in common usage in all Soviet diplomatic missions, is an abbreviation of the Russian mestnyi komitet, or "local committee." This phrase in turn is a euphemism for Trade Union, either the trade union of the MFA or that of the MFT. All officials and employees of the many ministries of the USSR belong to the "trade unions" thereof. In Soviet diplomatic missions abroad, however, the "trade union"

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or mestkom activities are usually limited to the non-diplomatic staff, although members of the diplomatic staff participate in certain of their functions, viz., the organization and running of summer camps for the children of the colony.

In general, the work of the mestkom is social rather than political in nature, although the political element is ever-present. The mestkom is involved in such activities as organizing choral groups; organizing the Saturday night movie schedule traditional in every Soviet diplomatic establishment; organizing picnics in the countryside and mass visits to museums and other "cultural" pursuits; presenting lectures on the latest advancements of Soviet science and art, and so forth. The political element is present in the figure of the mestkom secretary, usually a Party activist who is a member of the Party Bureau and who is responsible for making certain that no possible deviation from the Party line crops up in any mestkom discussions or activities.

The mestkom and Party organizations frequently sponsor joint "evenings of relaxation and culture," particularly on the occasion of the national holidays, 7 November and 1 May, and also on Women's Day, Constitution Day and the like. In most Soviet diplomatic missions, the mestkom is also usually responsible for the running of the dreary "club," which Kaznacheyev described in Inside a Soviet Embassy. The mestkom is a conspicuous manifestation of the Soviet concept of the kollektiv; all hands kept busy at some "socially useful" task, which in fact may consist largely of watching one another.

4. Study Groups

Directives from the CC/CPSU regarding educational work among Party and Komsomol members abroad are implemented through the formation of study groups within the mission. The secretary of the Party Bureau nominates tutors, most of whom are graduates of advanced courses in Marxism/Leninism, to lead classes in political discussion and study, each class being composed of from five to ten members. The study and instruction done throughout the mission is at roughly three levels, tailored to the educational background and political "maturity" of the various elements of the staff. At the lowest level, instruction is given in such subjects as the history of the USSR, and the organization of the Soviet government. These courses are attended mainly by the wives of non-diplomatic employees, although a few wives of members of the diplomatic staff may be included.

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At the next level, study centers on the history of the CPSU, and the standard writings of Marx and Lenin are read and discussed. This course is normally attended by members of the non-diplomatic staff, e.g., the zavkhoz and the code clerks, and sometimes by the wives of the diplomatic staff.

At the highest level, study is concentrated on subjects which require a solid foundation in Marxism/Leninism, such as political economy, dialectical materialism, imperialism, and so forth. Those who participate in such study are usually only members of the diplomatic staff, whether genuine diplomats or RIS officers, who have already had many years of study of Marxism/Leninism at the university level. At this level, studies may be conducted either in groups or alone in consultation with a tutor.

Group study meetings are regularly scheduled and are held two or three times each month, each session lasting between two or three hours in the evening after normal working hours. The classes are held on the embassy or Commercial Mission premises, in any convenient room or office.

G. MISCELLANEOUS ASPECTS OF A SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MISSION

1. The Atmosphere in a Soviet Diplomatic Mission

Seen outside his embassy, the Soviet diplomat often wears a mask of self-confident superiority; inside those walls he is very much a human being, and often a very second-rate one. To be posted abroad is obviously a highly-sought prize among the Soviets, yet in most respects life for them outside the USSR is not vastly different from what it is in Moscow. In many parts of the world the personnel of a Soviet diplomatic staff live in crowded conditions, one family to a room, sharing kitchen, bath and toilet facilities. Where there is no embassy compound as such, it is often common practice for the embassy to buy or rent on a long-term contract, large villas or apartment houses, and crowd most of the staff into them. Those who live apart from the other members of the colony are usually senior diplomatic officers or RIS officers whose operational duties require them to have presentable quarters for representational purposes. Although there have been and now are exceptions, such as a book-keeper or other non-diplomatic staffer living with his family apart from the other members of the colony, this is still the general rule. The press correspondents, however, almost invariably live apart from the other Soviets in private apartments.

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The crowded conditions under which the Soviets often live inevitably breed quarrels, often starting with arguments among small children, then spreading quickly to the women and finally to their husbands. There is a great deal of bickering, which often leads to violent quarrels, over such matters as whose room has a better view or is better heated or ventilated. If it is true, as one leading Soviet expert has said, that in the USSR the very notion of privacy is in danger of becoming obsolete, it is equally true for the members of a Soviet colony abroad.

The low pay received abroad by the staff of a Soviet diplomatic mission is another source of irritation, especially after the newly-arrived Soviet learns that his Bloc counterpart often earns considerably more than he, and enjoys certain perquisites unknown to the Soviet service. At least in Western countries, that the average Soviet is as eager for material goods as the rest of mankind is shown by the fact that he and his wife spend a great deal of time window-shopping and talk endlessly among themselves about which model of household appliance made in the host country is the best bargain. (In New York, the staff of the permanent Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, as well as members of visiting Soviet delegations, spend hours haggling with the pushcart peddlers on the Lower East Side, trying to get the best bargains in the second-rate merchandize offered there.) The average Soviet family abroad scrimps, saves and pinches every penny during its tour, and towards the end of it goes on a shopping spree, buying up all manner of consumer goods to take back to the USSR. As noted above, the MFA diplomat seldom eats in a local restaurant or stops in a local bar, as much for the reason that he cannot afford it as out of fear of being reported to the KGB rezidentura. That his KGB and GRU colleagues visit restaurants, bars and night clubs freely is an obvious source of resentment to him.

Drunkenness is a common problem in the Soviet colony, particularly among the non-diplomatic staff but among the diplomatic staff as well. Like other diplomatic personnel, Soviet diplomatic personnel have access to tax-free diplomatic stores, yet in many areas the ambassador himself must approve all purchases of spirits and other alcoholic beverages, which he usually limits to two bottles per month. There is clear evidence that the frustrations built up by the routine of life in a Soviet colony are aired during parties inside the mission, when drink is available; arguments break out, often ending in physical violence.

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The Soviet abroad is kept constantly busy. When not attending to his assigned professional duties five-and-one-half days per week or longer, he is attending a Party or mestkom meeting, or doing some "socially useful" work. Each member of the staff is expected to contribute some of his free time to such tasks as repairing the "club," helping in the library or joining in the work of the embassy choral group. Attendance at the traditional Saturday night movie in the mission is virtually mandatory. Excursions to the countryside, to a museum or art gallery are always organized and attended by large parts of the staff in a body. The concept of the kollektiv is all-pervading.

Although the conditions described above are little different from those in the USSR, there is a noteworthy difference. In the Soviet Union most people live under such conditions; abroad, in many parts of the world, on the other hand, it is obvious to the Soviet that the local population around him — oppressed, exploited and downtrodden according to the precepts of Marx and Lenin — live better than he and enjoy a degree of freedom which is inconceivable to him.

At least on the surface there is complete equality among all members of the staff of a diplomatic mission; first name and patronymic are usually used in the daily routine, and in Party meetings the atmosphere is "comradely." In reality, however, the class system now prevalent in the USSR is to be found in equal measure abroad. The ambassador may be personally friendly with the ranking officers of the mission, but his attitude toward the rest of the diplomatic staff is "correct" and formal, and his treatment of the non-diplomatic staff is usually that of the boss who knows the power of his position and intends that it be respected. The attitudes of the rest of the diplomatic staff towards one another, and of them all towards the non-diplomatic staff are a reflection of the ambassador's attitude; superior to subordinate. Within the diplomatic staff the "straight" diplomat resents his RIS colleagues, those of the KGB because he knows that they are watching him, and those of both rezidenturas because they enjoy far more privileges than he, and because they are far less burdened than he with the drudge work of the embassy, e.g., translating endless articles from the local press into Russian.

Pressures and frustrations in a Soviet mission result from official as well as personal reasons. The seat of all power lying in the highly-centralized Moscow bureaucracy, what Moscow

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wants the mission is expected to obtain, and quickly; what the mission wishes from Moscow, Moscow either ignores or grants at a very leisurely pace. Thus, embassy officers complain that they cannot act on a matter of importance to relations between the host country and the USSR, because Moscow has issued no instructions, although the problem has been pressing for many months. Shipments of equipment needed in the daily life of the mission do not arrive for long periods of time, and then more often than not the equipment which arrives is not that which was ordered. The Soviet-made embassy cars break down and remain out of service for varying periods of time, because of lack of spare parts or because the wrong parts were sent. An internal telephone system equipped to handle 75 lines is requested; one which handles 25 lines is sent, with some of the vital parts missing and will not function, etc.

A sense of overall responsibility for the work of the mission often appears to be lacking among many Soviet diplomats. The common reply given to a request that Second Secretary "X" do a job which he does not consider to be completely his responsibility is "Go to hell, I have my own work." Some ambassadors have been known to complain that no one in the embassy seemed to know how to do his job, and that all were sitting about doing nothing but drawing their pay every two weeks. Despite the great amount of hostility which exists within a Soviet mission, in spite of the frustrations of life therein and the frequent disorderliness of the daily routine, Soviet missions throughout the world do not regularly collapse in chaos but continue to serve the ends of the Soviet State. But no matter what mask the Soviet mission may wear when seen by the outside world, the life inside that mission is an unpleasant one.

2. Social Life and Recreation

The social life of a Soviet mission takes place largely within the framework of the kollektiv, that is, it is highly organized and all are expected to participate — from the ambassador to the lowest member of the non-diplomatic staff. Aside from the organized parties which take place during the celebrations of major holidays (see C 11), the social life of the mission revolves around the activities of the "club," which is run by the mestkom (see F 3). The "club" is usually located either in the embassy itself or in one of the buildings within the compound and consists of one or two large rooms sparsely furnished with plain chairs and tables, a lecturn and a portable

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projection screen. Although there is no law or regulation which states that the staff are to spend their free hours in the "club," in fact all personnel, including those who live outside the compound, are expected to show up there regularly.

The highlight of the "club's" weekly activities is the Saturday night movie. Either a Soviet-made film or a non-Soviet film which has been reviewed by one of the local Party activists for political "correctness," the movie is preceded by a political lecture on some elevating theme such as "The Role of the Working Class of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War," delivered with greater or lesser enthusiasm by a Party or Komsomol member chosen for the task by the Party Bureau; and is usually followed by a dance. Attendance at the Saturday night movie is virtually mandatory and even the RIS personnel, who avoid the "club" assiduously during the rest of the week, are usually in attendance in full force. Nonattendance is viewed by the Party Bureau as "violation of the spirit of the kollektiv."

The library, to which only the mission staff have access, usually adjoins the "club" and is stocked with the usual works of Lenin, Marx, etc., and with the works of "approved" Soviet and foreign authors. The political works in the library are the chief source of material for the organized political study groups which are so integral a part of Soviet life, both in the USSR and abroad. New material for the library is almost always obtained through the local representative of Mezhkniga (International Book) and rarely from host-country bookstores. The task of running the library is often assigned to one of the junior diplomats.

Another prominent feature of social life in a Soviet mission is organized sports, usually in the form of volleyball. Volleyball games are organized both intramurally and with teams from foreign missions in the host country, usually from the Bloc embassies. (Such affairs with the American embassy are arranged only for RIS operational aims; during one of the reported volleyball games between Soviet and American mission teams, the Soviet team was composed entirely of KGB officers; in another, the Soviets sought a game with a team of the Marine guards, who are interesting targets of the KGB.) Pingpong tables are common in Soviet embassy "clubs."

Birthday parties for the children of the colony are frequently organized and a party is usually held at the end of the school

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year. The latter is a rather formal affair at which the ambassador gives a speech exhorting the children to be good Soviet citizens.

As noted elsewhere, social contact with foreigners, particularly Westerners, is forbidden except for intelligence purposes or for the purpose of winning them over to a pro-Soviet point of view. Soviet officials will not, therefore, normally invite Western acquaintances, or even neighbors or landlords, for evenings in their own apartments.

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